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ABSTRACT
Phishing is a widespread threat that has attracted a lot of attention from
the security community. A significant amount of research has focused on
designing automated mitigation techniques. However, these techniques have
largely only proven successful at catching previously witnessed phishing cam-
paigns. Characteristics of phishing emails and web pages were thoroughly
analyzed, but not enough emphasis was put on exploring alternate attack
vectors. Novel education approaches were shown to be effective at teach-
ing users to recognize phishing attacks and are adaptable to other kinds of
threats. In this thesis, we explore a large amount of existing literature on
phishing and present a comprehensive taxonomy of the current state of phish-
ing research. With our extensive literature review, we will illuminate both
areas of phishing research we believe will prove fruitful and areas that seem
to be oversaturated.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Phishing is a form of social engineering attack in which the attackers, termed
“phishers”, try to steal user information by impersonating an entity that
users trust. The information targeted by phishers includes usernames, pass-
words, credit card numbers, social security numbers, and so on. The most
common form of phishing involves sending an email to a user, with the sender
claiming to be a trusted entity (e.g., financial institution). The email’s mes-
sage attempts to convince the user to perform some actions which typically
begin with clicking an embedded URL that is included in the body of the
email. Clicking on the URL leads the user to a website controlled by the
phisher that claims to belong to the trusted entity. The website is often
created to mimic the targeted entity’s website in order to further deceive the
user. Any information that the user provides to the website is captured and
later exploited by the phisher.
Phishing is a common phenomenon. In 2007 alone, more than 3 million
adults in the United States lost money to phishing attacks [1]. With its
widespread nature, phishing attracts considerable attention from both the
web security and behavioral sciences communities. At its highest level, re-
search related to phishing can be split into two categories: works that study
the characteristics of the attack and works that study mitigation techniques.
Research focused on attack characteristics analyzes the nature of phishing
in order to identify elements of attacks that make them successful. These
elements include both the techniques employed by the phishers to deceive
the user and the characteristics of the users that make them more likely
to fall for phishing attacks. Some works in this category also explore the
ecosystem of phishers, studying the portion of their operation that happens
before the phishing emails are sent and after the credentials are submitted
by the victims.
Works that study mitigation techniques focus on the development of coun-
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termeasures to reduce the success rate of phishing attacks. A large fraction
of the studies in this area focus on the development of various detection
mechanisms that can automatically identify phishing websites. With an ef-
ficient detection technique, phishing websites could be reported to ISPs to
be filtered or taken down in a timely manner, thus reducing the number of
possible victims. Another approach to mitigating phishing is to deploy tools
on the user side that alert users when they are performing potentially unsafe
actions. A number of education efforts also try to determine effective ways
to teach users about phishing and how they can better defend themselves.
Traditional approaches to phishing education are ineffective. Typically,
users are provided numerous security guidelines they are expected to mem-
orize and there is no discussion of the risks involved. However, phishing
education research has shown great promise. In one such work, researchers
subjected users to controlled, ultimately harmless phishing attacks. Once a
user has been thoroughly duped by the phishing attack and thus has clicked
the link, users are shown training materials, thus taking advantage of the
teachable (if embarrassing) moment. Alternative education resources such
as games and comics were also presented and were shown to be more effec-
tive than traditional resources.
In this thesis, we explore phishing literature and present a taxonomy of the
current state of phishing research. The taxonomy is comprised of literature
that studies both attack characteristics and mitigation techniques, with a
primary focus on phishing attacks in the form of spoofed emails and websites.
However, since this is not the only technique that phishers employ to steal
information from users, we also include a small portion of literature that
studies other phishing strategies such as a DNS poisoning attack and attacks
on mobile platforms. The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. in chapter
2, we discuss related work. In chapter 3, we explore research that studies
different elements of phishing attacks. In section 3.5, we discuss work that
studies phishing from the victim’s perspective. Mitigation techniques are
discussed in chapter 4, and user education approaches are discussed in section
4.4. Ethical approaches to conducting phishing experiments are discussed in
chapter 5, and we conclude the thesis in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Several authors have published surveys on the different aspects of phishing.
van der Merwe et al.[2] surveyed phishing attack characteristics and the
actions and responsibilities that must be taken by users and businesses to
prevent phishing attacks. The authors indicate a shift in responsibilities from
businesses to users, as phishing presents a unique attack where security is no
longer solely the responsibility of the businesses. Although the authors suc-
cinctly identified the characteristics of phishing and recommended mitigation
techniques for users and businesses, the information presented in the paper is
over ten years old, and phishing has evolved considerably during that time.
While most of the information provided in the survey is still valid, the survey
does not take into account new attack techniques such as the fast-flux attack,
and some of the proposed recommendations were discovered to be ineffective
in later literature.
Milletary[3] performed a literature survey of technical trends in phishing
attacks and countermeasures. The author gave an overview of the tools and
obfuscation techniques available to the phisher and proposed countermea-
sures. This survey provides a similar breadth of information to our work,
but it lacks depth. The author mentioned many types of countermeasures
in his survey but does not provide concrete examples or implementations of
the proposed techniques. In our work, we survey the phishing mitigation
systems that have been proposed and categorize them according to the type
of protection they provide.
Huang et al.[4, 5] surveyed the landscape of deceptive phishing attacks and
its countermeasures. In both of these works, the authors survey phishing
countermeasures but lack the breadth of information present in our work.
The authors studied many of the detection and defense techniques that are
covered in our work, but they failed to discuss most of the machine-learning
based detection strategies. They only briefly cover literature that studied
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the behaviors of phishing victims, which we cover in greater depth.
A number of papers surveyed phishing defense and detection techniques.
Zhang et al.[6] and Khonji et al.[7] analyzed both software and education
based anti- phishing techniques. Alomani et al.[8] specifically surveyed phish-
ing email filtering techniques, and Foozy et al.[9] created a taxonomy for
phishing detection on mobile devices. These surveys are very comprehensive
in terms of coverage of anti-phishing techniques, but they do not discuss the
characteristics of the attacks or the targets with the same depth as our work.
Specifically, in addition to a survey of mitigation techniques, our work dis-
cusses the elements of phishing attacks and the victims that could influence
the success rate of the attack.
Most of the aforementioned surveys concentrate on phishing countermea-
sures, thus painting an incomplete picture of the phishing problem. The
other surveys that focus on the breadth of the phishing problem do not dis-
cuss each aspect of the problem in detail, giving only an overview of the
knowledge in the area. In this work, we provide a taxonomy of phishing
research that encompasses both the characteristics of the attack and the
mitigation strategies.
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CHAPTER 3
ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS
In this chapter, we explore the characteristics of phishing attacks exhibited
by the attacker. We explore various elements found in phishing emails that
entice the user’s trust and how they can act as tunable knobs that allow
phishers to increase the effectiveness of their attack. An analysis of a class
of phishing attacks that leverage contextual information about the victims
is discussed, and an overview of the phishing operation that happen before
phishing emails are sent out and after the credentials were submitted by the
victim is presented.
3.1 Phishing Cues
In this section, we examine elements of phishing that have been determined
in current literature to significantly affect the success rate of phishing cam-
paigns. This includes elements from phishing emails, websites, and URLs.
Researchers have identified these phishing elements of interest by analyzing
phishing emails and websites, then determining how they affect the success
rate of a campaign by constructing fake phishing emails or websites with
elements of interest. The fake phishing websites are often evaluated by par-
ticipants in a lab-based studies, and fake phishing emails can either be eval-
uated in lab settings or sent out to the participants in the same fashion as
the attacker.
3.1.1 Email
The research in this category explores elements of a phishing email and de-
termines how they affect the success rate of the email. A phishing email is
considered successful if it is able to trick the user into clicking on the em-
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bedded link. Some elements that were considered include the use of social
context, urgency cues, personalization, and other real-world elements such
as phone numbers.
Harrison et al.[10] conducted an experiment to determine if the percep-
tions of presence in a phishing attack would influence the victimization rate.
In their experiment, the authors sent two types of phishing emails to under-
graduate students at a university. Both types have the same message, but
the first type of emails contained only the message while the second type is
rich in contents. The content-rich email has the university’s logo, two images
that indicate other means of contact (a phone number and a Skype id), and
a security indicator (DocuSign electric signature). Both fake phishing emails
achieve a total of 68% victimization rate, with the content- rich phishing
email having almost double the success rate of a plaintext phishing email.
Jagatic et al. [11] conducted a social phishing experiment in which phish-
ing emails with spoofed sender addresses were used. The authors started by
crawling social network websites to build a database of relationship between
the participants, then crafted each phishing email such that each subject
received an email that appears to be sent by one of their friends at the uni-
versity. The authors were able to successfully phish 72% of the participants
with the phishing emails that appears to be sent by a friend, compared to
a 16% success rate for participants who received a phishing email from a
fictitious university account.
Karakasiliotis et al.[12] assessed users’ susceptibility to phishing by per-
forming a survey where participants were shown 20 screenshots of emails
and were asked to they think each email was legitimate. The result showed
that the overall correct classification rate of 42%, along with 26% “don’t
know” responses. Qualitatively, the participants mentioned that elements
such as personalization, grammatical and typographical errors, promotional
offers, social proof, and indication of scarcity were influential factors in their
decision.
Blythe et al.[13] performed four studies that investigate why people fall
for phishing. They found that cues such as spelling and grammatical errors
could not be relied on to detect phishing attack, and that phishing emails
with logos have significantly lower detection rate in the online survey. The
authors also found that blind people can often identify phishing in the first
few lines of the email by detecting elements such as the omission of personal
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address, spelling or grammatical errors, and an unlikely sounding premise.
This result motivated the authors to perform a forth experiment, which draws
on literary and critical theory to consider why some phishing strategy remain
effective. They argued that the focus of individuals on banking and security
services make phishing in this context effective as it plays neatly on the
victim’s anxieties in both form and content.
Wang et al.[14] developed a framework to explore phishing from the per-
spective of the victim. The authors identified five key design features of
phishing attacks from phishing literature - email argument quality, email
title, message appearance, website appearance, and assurance mechanism -
and use them to perform a coding-based content analysis of phishing emails.
Cluster analysis of the coded phishing emails revealed an evolutionary trend,
with the data showing an improvement in quality of the attacks and a shift in
target industries and target information over time. Other notable changes in
the evolution of the design features of the email and website includes better
use of indicators that induced trust in victims and the increase use of words
that indicate urgency and impact in email’s title and message.
Ferreira and Lenzini[15, 16] identify elements that reflect the effectiveness
of phishing from other literature, and categorize them according to the prin-
ciple of persuasion in social engineering (PPSE). The authors were able to
identify 20 elements that constitute successful phishing emails and their asso-
ciated principles from PPSE, and use them to guide a qualitative analysis of
52 phishing emails. They found that the Distraction principle is most preva-
lent in phishing emails, followed by Authority even when the most common
elements from each categories were different. Distraction principle covered
phishing emails that trick victims into focusing on what they could gain or
possibly miss out on if they do not act immediately and Authority principle
covered emails that use authoritative tones.
Downs et al.[17] conducted a laboratory study where they interviewed 20
non-expert computer users to gain insight into their decision strategy when
they encountered suspicious email. The study consisted of two segments: a
role-play segment where the participants role-play as someone who is going
through their email, and a survey segment where the participants were asked
to describe their own online behaviors. Overall, all participants in the study
noted various security cues that can be use to determine the legitimacy of
a website, such as a lock icon or broken images on web pages, but they did
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not necessarily have the skills needed to interpret these cues appropriately.
Participants also employed different strategies to make decisions about the
trustworthiness of email, but most of these strategies rely on the interpreta-
tion of the message rather than the cues in the email’s header.
Tsow and Jakobsson[18] conducted an investigation of trust manipulation
tactics used by phishing email and web sites. The participants in the exper-
iment were shown 6 email screenshots followed by 6 web page screenshots
and were asked to rate their authenticity or phishiness on a five point Likert
scale. The results showed that third party endorsement and glossy graph-
ics are effective as authenticity simulators when the email content was short
and unsurprising but fail to be significantly effective when applied to a more
involved message. One surprising result was a great increase in trust caused
by a small legal footprint in an email that already exhibited strong person-
alization.
Jakobsson[19] performed a qualitative study where the participants speak
out their thoughts as they rated phishing stimuli and attempted to deter-
mine what caused the subject to decide on the trustworthiness of stimuli. He
found that the appearance, including spelling and grammar, URL, person-
alization, and padlock icons matter to users in determining the authenticity
of messages. Participants were suspicious of messages with bad design or
grammatical errors, and detect IP addresses in URL as being illegitimate.
Personalization and padlock icons in the body of the message increased the
trustworthiness of the message as well as the use of brand name endorsement
such as Verisign and suggestion of independent channels such as a telephone
number. Also, participants often decided the legitimacy of a stimulus based
on the content before checking its authenticity; participants reject stimuli
that offered monetary rewards or requested credentials but considered email
that only contain information as safe. Further, the participants considered
email stimuli to be more phishy than web pages, but considered phone calls
to be safe.
Overall, many factors were identified in literature that can be used as knobs
to adjust the effectiveness of a phishing campaign. Many results suggest
that users tend to reject emails that have bad design or have spelling or
grammatical errors as being illegitimate, so one of the most important aspects
of any successful phishing email is to have a message that is well designed and
has little to no errors. Email with messages that convey a sense of urgency or
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have an authoritative tone are effective at enticing users to perform security
compromising actions. Some elements that can be added to the emails to
improve their legitimacy in the eyes of the users are the logo of the target
company, lock icon, brand name endorsement (e.g. VeriSign and DocuSign),
and legal footprints. The use of real-world content such as phone numbers
and personalized greetings as well as social contexts are also found to be
effective.
3.1.2 Website
The works in this category aim to identify elements of a phishing website that
entice trust from the users. Specifically, the works in this area try to identify
the elements that users look for when they are evaluating the legitimacy of
a website, and how phishing websites exploit them to trick the user into
believing that they are on a legitimate website.
Fogg et al.[20] conducted an online study to investigate how different el-
ements of a website affect a user’s perception of credibility. The results
indicated that the most effective way to enhance the credibility of a website
is to include elements that convey the “real world” aspect of an organization
such as physical address and photographs of employees. Additionally, ease
of use of the website and the inclusion of elements that express expertise and
trustworthiness were also key components of a credible website. However,
overly commercial elements and signs of amateurism such as typographical
errors and broken links can be damaging to a site’s credibility. In another
study, the authors conducted an experiment to determine the features of a
website that get noticed when people evaluate its credibility[21]. The results
indicate that most participants use the website’s design, structure, and in-
formation presented to assess the credibility of a website. Other participants
also mention using a company’s motive, usefulness and accuracy of informa-
tion, name reputation, and advertising as factors in evaluating credibility.
Dhamija et al. [22] ran an experiment in which 22 participants were shown
20 websites and asked to determine which ones are fraudulent. They found
that the participants who only look at the website’s content performed signif-
icantly worse than the participants who also examined other security features
presented by the browser. They also found that naive participants made in-
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correct judgments because of lack knowledge about computer systems and
security indicators, and more experienced participants were tricked by visual
deceptions such as a spoofed URL or SSL indicator.
Grazioli et al.[23] conducted an experiment that asked the participants to
determine if a website is trustworthy. In the experiment, the participants
are split equally into two groups, with one group viewing a real commercial
website and the other group viewing a fake website built by the authors.
The result suggested that, on average, the participants cannot discriminate
between the legitimate website and the fake website, and that successful
participants noticed significantly fewer deceptive cues than the unsuccessful
participants. The authors believed that this is a result of the successful par-
ticipants finding conclusive evidences that the website is a deception and stop
searching. Overall, they found that successful participants rely on assurance
cues (warranties and trust seals) and tend to discount trust cues (customer
endorsements), which is the opposite of the unsuccessful participants.
Tsow and Jakobsson[18] conducted an investigation of trust manipulation
tactics used by phishing email and web sites. The participants in the experi-
ment were shown 6 email screenshots followed by 6 web page screenshots and
were asked to rate its authenticity or phishiness on a five point Likert scale.
The result showed a clear preference for a simulated web page whose domain
name matched its content over a genuine page whose domain only weakly
connected to the same content. The experiment also verified that overuse of
security notices have significant negative effect on genuineness. Lastly, one
of the most trusted stimuli in the study is a third party web page created to
handle embarrassing incidents (a hardware recall) for their corporate clients,
which showed that the context of the message enticed more trust in spite of
the message’s poor personalization, illegitimate URL, and relatively simple
layout.
In general, researchers have identified many website elements that entice
trust in the user. Real world aspects of the organization such as physical
address and photographs of employees as well as the company’s motive and
the accuracy of the provided information make a website appears more trust-
worthy to users. Ease of use of a website and signs of professionalism are also
important. Elements such as overly commercial elements, typographical er-
rors, and broken links and images can be damaging to a website’s credibility.
Assurance cues such as warranties and third party trust seals are reported to
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entice trust in advanced users, while trust cues such as customer endorsement
are more heavily relied on by novice users. The choice of domain name is
also important, as users showed a clear preference for a fake web page whose
domain name matched its content over a genuine page whose domain only
weakly connected to the same content. One experiment also verified that
overuse of security notices have a significant negative effect on the perceived
genuineness of a website.
3.1.3 URL
The research in this category aim to identify characteristics of phishing URLs
and identify techniques employed by the phishers to make phishing URLs ap-
pear to be legitimate. Specifically, this includes the techniques employed by
the phishers to construct phishing URLs, and techniques that were employed
to entice the users to click on the URL.
Spaulding et al.[24] reviewed the landscape of domain name typosquatting,
which are domain names that uses typographical variants of other domains
deliberately for malicious purposes. These domain names are generated in
such a way that exploit common typographical errors made by users, with
some of the most common generation models being missing dot typos (e.g.
wwwexample.com), character permutation, character substitution, character
duplication, and character omission. An extended model would include all
domain names with a Damerau-Levenshtein edit distance of one from the
target domain name, and a more technically advance techniques exploited
random bit errors to redirect victim to a domain name with a hamming dis-
tance of one bit from the target domain (e.g. mic2osoft.com). The top-level
domain(TLD) portion of a domain name may also be a target for exploita-
tion, where one .com domain name may have a malicious .org counterpart.
Waziri[25] surveyed different types of website forgery techniques, phish-
ing attacks, and their countermeasures. The author identifies that phishing
websites can be hosted on various web hosting services or by hijacking other
websites or devices, discusses various obfuscation techniques employed on the
phishing websites and its countermeasures. These techniques include various
URL and domain name obfuscation techniques such as domain typosquatting
and inclusion of the target’s domain in the subdomain or path, and the use
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of images instead of text to display spoofed URLs.
Downs et al.[26] conducted a survey designed to measure user’s behav-
ioral response to phishing across a large population. The survey consisted
of several sections: email role play, URL evaluation, warning messages reac-
tion, computer knowledge, past web experience, and negative consequences.
Overall, the authors found that the better knowledge of web environments
and URL structure predicts lower susceptibility to phishing attacks, but does
not increased false positive responses to legitimate emails. This implied that
users who do not know how to parse URL is more susceptible to the attack.
McGrath and Gupta[27] examine the phishing modus operandi by ana-
lyzing phishing URLs from PhishTank[28] and MarkMonitor[29], legitimate
URLs from DMOZ, and supportive information from WHOIS and zone files of
4 generic TLDs. DMOZ is a large open- content directory of user-submitted
URLs. They found that the distribution of the length of phishing URLs and
domain names are different from the legitimate URLs in DMOZ, namely the
length of the phishing URLs peak at a larger number of characters, while
the phishing domains tend to be shorter than regular domains in DMOZ.
Furthermore, the distribution of letters in DMOZ’s domains closely resem-
bles the English character distribution while phishing domains have smaller
peaks at each of the vowels and fewer number of unique characters. Fur-
thermore, phishing URLs often contain the name of the brand that they are
spoofing, and some phishers are abusing the URL shortening services. From
the domain registration perspective, most domains registered for the purpose
of phishing are put to use almost immediately, and their lifetime on average
is a little over three days.
Chhabra et al.[30] analyzed the use of URL-shortening services to obfus-
cate phishing URLs. Using data from Twitter, bit.ly, and PhishTank, the
authors found that the space gain for most phishing URLs are smaller than
those of generic URLs, suggesting that the URL shorteners are primarily used
by phishers not to shorten the length of the URL, but to hide the identity of
the actual phishing URL. Analysis of referrals for the bit.ly URLs that were
identified as phishing also showed many websites other than Twitter that
are referrer of the URL. Since the other websites did not impose a limit of
message length, this finding further affirmed the hypothesis that URL short-
ening services are being use to hide phishing URLs. They also found that
online social media brands are targeted more than financial institutions and
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e-commerce websites on Twitter, suggesting a change in target for phishers.
Fu et a.[31] proposed a phishing strategy based on the use of Internation-
alized Resource Identifier (IRI). In IRI scheme, the glyph of many characters
have similar appearance although their underlying Unicode values are differ-
ent. This would be beneficial to the phisher, as it allowed for a construction
of URIs that are visually similar to the phisher’s target, but resolve to a
different resource controlled by the phisher.
Overall, phishers employ many URL obfuscation techniques to trick the
users. Phishing URLs often include the domain name of their target in the
URL, either as a subdomain or in the path, to trick users who do not have a
good understanding of URL structure. Typosquatted domain are also com-
mon, and some research has raised awareness about the use of international-
ized resource identifier to construct phishing URL that is visually similar to
the target URL. URL shortening services are found to be abused to obfuscate
phishing URLs, and phishers employed techniques such as the use of images
of URLs to cover up the real destination of the embedded link.
3.1.4 Summary
In conclusion, the works discussed in this section have identified many knobs
that the phishers could use to adjust the effectiveness of their phishing cam-
paign. The factor that was highlighted the most is that an email or a website
that is not well-designed and exhibit signs of amateurism such as typograph-
ical or grammatical errors are almost always regarded as suspicious by the
users. For email, messages that convey a sense of urgency or have an au-
thoritative tone are more effective at enticing the users to perform some
action, and factors such as brand name endorsement, lock icon, and logo of
the target company can make the message appears more genuine. For the
website, content that exhibit the real world aspect of the target such as a
fake physical address, a fake phone number, or pictures of employee as well as
customer endorsement can increase the website’s credibility. Having a URL
that matches the content of the website can also make it appears more gen-
uine, and phishers are known to use technique such as typosquatting, URL
shortener, and inclusion of the target domain name in the phishing URLs to
trick the users.
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3.2 Spear Phishing
Spear phishing attack, also known as context aware phishing attack, is a
form of specialized phishing attack where the phishing email is crafted with
contextual information about the target. A spear phishing attack against a
user may leverage information such as the user’s name and address to create
an email that is personalized to the user. Against a company, a spear phishing
email may leverage information such as the employee names or current events
in the company to make the phishing email appears legitimate. The works in
this section study the success rate of spear phishing attacks and techniques
that can be leverage by an attacker to find contextual information.
Jakobsson[32] introduced a visualization tool to model and describe threats
on a complex system and used it to describe context aware phishing attacks.
The visualization tool models a phishing attack by a directed graph where
vertices represent knowledge or access rights. An edge from vertex u to vertex
v represents a mean of obtaining information or access right in vertex v given
the information available in vertex u. Each edge also has a weight assigned
to it to represent the probability of a successful attack. The author then
used the model to describe context aware attacks targeting eBay and online
banking system.
Jakobsson and Stamm[33] discussed browser sniffing attack and proposed
countermeasures. Browser sniffing attack is an attack in which an attacker
extracts information about websites that a user visited from his browser’s
cache and history. These information are then used to launch context aware
phishing attack at the user. The authors proposed two approaches to defend
against browser sniffing: cache pollution and URL customization. Cache
pollution purposefully adds a set of URLs to the browser’s history for each
URL that a user visited, and URL customization utilizes a proxy server to
personalize all URLs before sending them to the browser. The authors argue
that this scheme provides perfect privacy for internal pages of a protected
domain, and some privacy for the entrance pages. Jakobsson also proposed
a server-side security techniques called Remote-Harm Detection[34]. RHD
probed the client’s browser history in the same manner to gauge whether the
client may be infected with malware. However, browser sniffing vulnerability
was recognized and patched by most browser vendors, so we only include it
here for information purposes.
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Gupta et al.[35] explored the feasibility and scalability of a phishing at-
tack that abuses phone numbers. The authors enumerated 1.16 million phone
numbers, then for each number looked up the owner’s information in True-
Caller. TrueCaller is an application that allows a user to search for owner
information of a phone number. If a Facebook ID was found in the owner
information, the system used it to crawl for public information of the owner.
The authors also used Whatsapp, a cross-platform mobile messaging appli-
cation, as a separate vector by leveraging its address book syncing feature,
which can automatically connect the user with other Whatsapp users whose
phone number is in the address book. By aggregating the information from
these sources, the authors were able to identify 51,409 users who could be
the target of social phishing attacks, 180,000 users who could be the target
of spear phishing attacks, and 24,464 users who could be the target of nor-
mal phishing attacks. The authors also conducted a role-play experiment on
Amazon Mechanical Turk to determine the effectiveness of a phishing attack
over a messaging application such as Whatsapp. They found success rates
of 34.5%, 54.3%, and 69.2% for non-targeted phishing, spear phishing, and
social phishing attack, respectively.
Dodge et al. [36, 37] tested the efficacy of their information awareness
training by conducting an email phishing exercise on the student body of the
United States Military Academy. The average rate at which the students
behaved incorrectly was found to be 40% overall. Surprisingly, execution
of malicious attachments was shown to be a more successful vector than
clicking on an embedded link. The authors also noted that some students
reported that they found the email to be suspicious, but since it was signed
by a colonel they decided to carry out the actions. This illustrates a possible
vulnerability in the institution and indicates that the results may be biased
because of the students’ mindset.
Jagatic et al. [11] conducted a social phishing experiment in which phishing
emails with a spoofed sender address were used. The authors reported a 72%
success rate for emails with a spoofed sender, compared to a 16% success rate
for generic phishing emails.
Steyn et al.[38] conducted a naturalistic phishing exercise where phishing
emails were sent to 400 staff members of a university in South Africa. The
emails asked the recipient to confirm the details of his account by clicking on
a link in the email. The exercise was conducted after a recent implementa-
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tion of a new system at the university, which provided a great opportunity
for a spear phishing exercise. The results showed that an alarming 53% of
the recipients gave away information to the fake website, and an additional
13% clicked on the link but did not provide information. Only 7.2% of the
recipients reported the incident to the university’s ICT staff members.
Mohebzada et al.[39] conducted two large scale naturalistic phishing ex-
periments. Phishing emails were sent to students, faculty members, staffs,
and alumni totaling over 10,000. One phishing email was spoofed to be sent
from the university’s IT department and asked the recipient to reset his uni-
versity password. The other email was spoofed to be from a “research group”
and asked the recipient to participate in a survey about his banking expe-
rience and financial information. The researchers were able to get a 8.74%
success rate for the first experiment and a 2.05% success rate for the second
experiment.
Holm et al.[40] performed two naturalistic phishing experiments targeting
a Swedish technology consulting company in the electrical power domain.
The first experiment simulated a generic phishing attack, and the second
experiment simulated a spear phishing attack. The results from the two
experiments indicated that while the context aware phishing attack got more
victims, it also attracted significantly greater attention. In this case, everyone
in the company knew about the intent of the context aware email within 9
minutes, while the traditional phishing email was not discussed or reported
at all.
While many of the experiments listed here did not provide a comparison
between the success rate of a spear phishing email and that of a normal phish-
ing email, the trend appears to be that spear phishing emails can succeed
against significantly more victims. Interestingly, results from one experiment
indicate that while spear phishing emails attracted more victims, they were
also considerably louder. This implies that although a spear phishing attack
allows the attacker to steal more credentials in a shorter amount of time, con-
text free phishing emails may be more suitable when the goal of the attacker
is to launch an attack without being noticed. Other works also demonstrate
that techniques such as browser sniffing and phone number enumeration can
be used to gather contextual information about the targets.
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3.3 Other Attack Vectors
In this section, we discuss works that study the characteristics of phishing
attacks that do not involve the use of phishing emails. With the widespread
adoption of smartphones, researchers have discovered new phishing attack
vectors that leverage characteristics of mobile platforms such as the smaller
screen and various interactions between applications that are unique to the
platform. DNS poisoning is also discussed as an attack vector that direct the
user to the phishing website without requiring phishing emails.
3.3.1 Mobile Devices
New attack vectors were introduced with the widespread use of smartphones.
Smaller device screen sizes as well as services such as notification systems
and context switching between applications introduced unique new phish-
ing attack vectors in this platform that did not exist in traditional desktop
browsers. The works in this section survey the behaviors of smartphone ap-
plications and notification systems, and identify ways in which they can be
exploited to launch phishing attacks.
Felt and Wagner[41] conducted a systematic analysis of the ways in which
applications and websites on a mobile device link to each other and eval-
uated how these interactions can increase the risk of phishing attacks. By
manually analyzing control transfers between applications, they found that
for many of these control transfers, the website or application that received
the transfer would prompt the user for information such as passwords or pay-
ment information. This was the case because most of the transfers directed
the user to social media platforms or application stores, which required the
user to enter his password to authorize access or payment. This process
habituated the user to expect to re-enter this information even after control
transfer had occurred, making them susceptible to phishing attacks where the
sender application visually spoofs the control transfer to capture the user’s
information. The authors also discussed a man in the middle attack where a
malicious application could register itself as a default handler for certain con-
trol transfer schemes and capture the user’s input before transferring them
to the legitimate application.
Xu and Zhu[42] analyzed the vulnerability of notification services on smart-
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phone operating systems and demonstrated how a malicious application could
create anonymous phishing or spam notifications. Notification on each smart-
phone operating system was customized to various degree, which allowed a
malicious application to abuse these customizations and send anonymized
phishing notifications to the user. To illustrate this, the authors implemented
an application that created a notification that was visually identical to a no-
tification created by the Facebook application. Once a user clicked on the
notification, the malicious application presented the user with a fake Face-
book login page, captured the input, terminated itself, and then launched
the legitimate Facebook application. To prevent this attack, the authors pro-
posed that the smartphone OS should reserve a portion of each notification
to display the icon and name of the application that created the notification
and log all notification creation events and creators.
Niu et al.[43] studied the Safari browser on the iPhone and discovered vul-
nerabilities that exposed users to website spoofing attacks. Specifically, the
browser’s chrome on the Safari browser is simple and immutable, allowing
the phisher to easily spoof it on the phishing website. The browser’s chrome
also automatically hides when the user scrolls down the web page, an action
that can be exploited by malicious JavaScript code to hide the chrome. Ad-
ditionally, The address bar in the Safari browser shows a truncated version
of a long URL by using ellipses, allowing the attackers to visually spoof a
legitimate URL by putting the target domain name as a subdomain. The
result of a small scale user study indicated that even expert users who could
identify all the phishing websites on a desktop failed to notice the spoofed
browser’s chrome, and many of them disregarded the scrolling problem as a
bug in the browser.
In general, the works in this section highlight the need for better security
in mobile systems. Since users are trained to expect authentication dialogues
when a context switch occurs between applications, defense mechanisms need
to be put in place to ensure that users are interacting with a legitimate
application. The notification authentication issue also needs to be addressed
in a way that allow users to easily identify the real creator of a notification
without harming the aesthetic nature of notification customization. Lastly,
browsers in smartphone need to adapt many security indicators from their
desktop counterparts to display effectively on smaller screen sizes.
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3.3.2 DNS Poisoning
DNS poisoning, sometime referred to as pharming, is an attack where the
entries in a local DNS server are manipulated to direct users to a locally
hosted phishing website. The attack consists of a rouge access point with
a local DNS server setup to direct users of a target website to a phishing
website that is hosted locally at the access point. This limits the scope of
victims to users who are connected to the access point, but it also bypasses
the need to send out phishing emails.
Abu-Nimeh et al.[44, 45] proposed an attack to bypass browser’s security
toolbars and phishing filters via local DNS poisoning. The authors evaluated
the attack against five security toolbars and browser filters, and they were
able to verify that all the tested security tools were unable to detect the
attack, and some even confirmed that the users were at legitimate websites.
The authors also noted that since the phishing websites were hosted locally, it
was impossible for web crawlers to detect the website and issue a blacklist or
a takedown, and there was no need to send phishing emails. To counter this
attack, Kim and Huh[46] proposed a phishing detection framework through a
new heuristic based on network performance characteristics of the websites.
Four aspects of the routing information were considered: the use of a firewall,
the mean round-trip time (RTT) of all hops, the local route length in hops,
and the total route length in hops. Using routing data for 50 legitimate
websites and 500 phishing websites, the authors evaluated multiple machine
learning classifiers and found that K-nearest neighbors performed the best
with a true positive rate of 99.4% and a false positive rate of 0.7%.
While pharming is its own category of attack, this group of works illustrate
how DNS poisoning attack techniques can be utilized for phishing purposes.
DNS poisoning attacks allow the attacker to evade many defense mechanisms
and direct a specific group of users to a phishing website without the need for
phishing email. A defense mechanism against DNS poisoning attack based
on network performance analysis is proposed, and the preliminary results are
encouraging.
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3.3.3 Distributed Phishing Attack
Jakobsson and Young[47] described a novel type of phishing attack called
Distributed Phishing Attacks (DPA), with the main characteristics being
a per-victim personalization of the website that collects information from
the victim and covertly transmits that information to a hidden coordination
center runs by the phisher. In this context, the per- victim personalization
implies that each victim will be directed to a phishing website hosted on a
unique machine with different owner and location, and information about
the location of a phishing website cannot be inferred from another phishing
website.
3.3.4 Summary
In this section, we have discussed research efforts that identify new attack
vectors for phishing. Multiple characteristics of the mobile operating system
were identified that could be exploited to launch a phishing attack, and a
spoofing attack on a browser on a mobile platform was demonstrated. DNS
poisoning attacks were shown to be able to bypass many browser and toolbar
defenses, and a countermeasure based on analysis of network characteristics
was proposed.
3.4 Behind The Scene
The research in this section explores the characteristics of phishing that hap-
pen behind the scenes. Namely, the research in this category aims to answer
the questions about phishing that happens before phishing emails are sent
out and also after the victims enter their credentials into phishing websites.
Some of these questions include “What is the average lifetime of a phishing
campaign?”, “Where do phishers host their phishing websites?”, “Where do
credentials go after a victim has submitted them?”, and “How do phishers
get paid?”.
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3.4.1 Lifetime of Phishing Websites
The works in this category study the lifetime of phishing websites and its
relationship to the volume of phishing emails.
Moore et al.[48] analyzed the temporal relationship between the sending
of spam emails and the lifetime of phishing websites by using spam data
from IronPort’s SpamCop[49] and phishing website data from PhishTank,
APWG[50], and other brand owners. They found that fast-flux attacks ac-
counted for only 3% of distinct campaigns, but accounted for 67% of the total
observed spam volume, suggesting that they are a far more serious threat.
Fast-flux is a term coined in the phishing community to describe a decen-
tralized botnet with constantly changing DNS records, which are used by
the attacker as proxies to hide the real phishing website. This involves the
use of domain names that resolve to a large number of constantly changing
front proxies to hide the “mothership” that hosts the actual phishing web-
site. Fast- flux attackers also manage their spam campaigns more efficiently,
sending out a large volume of spams before the website is discovered and
stopping shortly after its removal. Moore’s data indicates that website take-
down is necessary, as long- lived phishing websites continue to send out spam
emails until they are taken down.
Moore and Clayton[51, 52] examined empirical data on phishing website re-
moval time and the number of visitors that a website attracted. The authors
gathered a list of reported phishing websites from PhishTank and extracted
their visitor statistics from Webalizer, which provides publicly available web
page usage information and is usually set up by default on the type of web
servers that seem to be regularly compromised. The authors found that
the lifetime of phishing websites followed a lognormal distribution, with the
fast-flux domains having a greater average lifetime than normal phishing do-
mains, and that phishing websites hosted on free-hosting webspaces have a
shorter lifetime than regular phishing websites. They also found that the
lifetime of phishing websites have a long tail, with one website being online
for over seventeen weeks. This serves to illustrate that even when take-down
is happening slowly, it can still reduce the damage done.
In short, while fast-flux phishing campaigns are low in number, they ac-
count for more than two-thirds of total phishing email volume, and they
have a greater average lifetime than normal phishing websites. This suggests
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that fast-flux campaigns are run by well-organized phishers, and efficient de-
tection methods for fast-flux campaigns can drastically reduce the volume
of phishing emails. Data also suggest that take-down of phishing websites
is critical, as phishers continuously send out phishing emails as long as the
phishing website is still live.
3.4.2 Locating Vulnerable Hosts
Phishers often utilize free hosting services to host their phishing websites.
However, in order to launch a big campaign or to start a fast-flux attack,
phishers need access to a large number of hosts spanning across different
ISPs. To accomplish this, phishers need to scan the Internet for vulnerable
hosts and exploit them to host the phishing web pages or proxies. The works
in this section study the methods that phishers use to identify vulnerable
hosts and exploit them to host phishing websites.
Moore and Clayton[53] studied the use of search engines to locate poten-
tially vulnerable hosts that can be exploited to host phishing websites. These
‘evil searches’ were categorized by the researchers into three distinct types:
vulnerability searches that looked for a particular version of a program that
is vulnerable to attacks, compromise searches that looked for existing phish-
ing or other compromised websites, and shell searches that looked for PHP
‘shells’. By analyzing feeds of phishing website URLs from both major brand
owners and other sources including APWG and PhishTank together with web
access logs from Webalizer-equipped websites, the authors found a consistent
pattern of evil searches appearing in web logs at or before the time of reported
compromise, with approximately 17.6% of hosts in their sample having evil
search terms in their logs. Furthermore, the authors found that many hosts
had multiple phishing websites on them, which suggests that these compro-
mised hosts may be re-compromised, and that hosts reached by evil search
face a 21% chance of re-compromise after 4 weeks compared to 14% oth-
erwise. This suggests that vulnerable websites that can be found through
search engines are likely to be repeatedly exploit until they are patched.
Some mitigation strategies reviewed by the authors include obfuscation of
server’s application details, evil search penetration testing, blocking of evil
search terms, removal of phishing sites from search results, and lowering of
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reputation of phished hosts. The authors also reported that phishing website
URLs that are made public by the PhishTank database had a statistically
significant reduction in their re-compromise rates, suggesting that defenders
were able to use this information to reduce criminal attacks[54].
Search engines are a powerful tool, and they are leveraged by phishers
to identify vulnerable hosts that can be exploited to host phishing web-
sites. Results from these studies also suggest that vulnerable hosts are ex-
ploited repeatedly by multiple phishers to host different phishing websites,
and that vulnerable hosts that are reached by evil searches are more likely
to be re-compromised over time. Vulnerable hosts that are publicly iden-
tified by blacklists are also found to have significantly lower re-compromise
rates, suggesting that these public announcements can notify defenders to
secure their machines. Some mitigation strategies against evil searches are
also proposed.
3.4.3 Dropboxes
After victims submit their credentials to a phishing website, the credentials
are often transmitted to the phisher via email. This seems to be the standard
method for the phishers who utilize phishing kits, which are comprehensive
ready-to-deploy phishing websites. Novice phishers obtain these phishing
kits and modify a few lines of code to specify the destination email addresses
for the credentials. The email accounts that were setup to receive the stolen
credentials from these phishing websites are dubbed dropboxes. The works
in this section attempt to identify phishing dropboxes and use them to infer
information about the phisher.
Cova et al.[55] studied phishing kits and identified the mechanisms that
phishers use to transmit stolen credentials from a phishing website. They also
investigated obfuscation techniques that were employed by the kit’s creator
to hide backdoors. The authors retrieved 353 kits from distribution sites
and extracted 150 kits from live phishing websites. They identified 129 kits
from distribution sites and 61 live kits that were backdoored to send all stolen
credentials to the kit’s creator as well. All of the phishing kits were written in
PHP and utilized the mail() function to send the stolen information via email
to the phisher. The authors also found that the creator’s email address in the
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backdoored kit was obfuscated by using different encodings or was retrieved
from a remote site. The code that was utilized to send the stolen information
to the creator was also obfuscated and social engineered by comments such
as “// do not change anything here”.
Zawoad et al.[56] proposed a clustering algorithm to reveal the relation-
ship between phishing websites based on common dropboxes. By clustering
phishing websites based on shared dropboxes, the authors were able to de-
termine the strongest and most pervasive phishers and kit creators as well
as the relationship between the kit creators and kit users. This relationship
showed that a number of kits were used by a large number of phishers, with
each phisher targeting a different website.
Moore and Clayton[57] proposed a technique to identify phishing drop-
boxes and their associated phishing websites by leveraging a list of known
phishing websites and email metadata maintained by an email provider. To
detect phishing dropboxes, the authors submitted trackable fake creden-
tials into 170 phishing websites targeting PayPal and monitored the mail
provider’s email metadata database for the submitted credentials. The au-
thors found 17 distinct dropboxes receiving credentials from 28 phishing web-
sites and indirectly uncovered 24 additional dropboxes by examining other
emails with similar subject lines. The authors also proposed a technique
to derive the phishing website that controlled the dropbox, dubbed an “in-
tersection attack”, by finding the intersection of the URLs that the victims
received via email prior to their credentials appearing in the dropbox.
The results from these studies suggest that phishers often run more than
one phishing campaign at a time, as evidenced by the number of credentials
being sent to different dropboxes. Most of the phishing kits were also found
to be backdoored, allowing the creator of the phishing kits to collect the
stolen credentials from the phishing website deployed by a kit user, essentially
receiving all the benefit and letting the phisher shoulder all the responsibility.
By analyzing the data about the dropboxes, a detection mechanism was
proposed that utilized the intersection of the set of URLs received by two
victims to identify the phishing URL.
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3.4.4 Phishing Economy
The research in this section explores the economy of phishing, specifically
highlighting the chain of events that occur after a phisher obtains a stolen
credential from a victim. This includes a discussion of the phisher’s market-
place and the phisher’s “cashout” method. Application of economic theory
to the phishing ecosystem was also conducted to verify if phishing is indeed
a path to riches.
Yu et al.[58] performed a root-cause analysis of the methods used in phish-
ing and the motivation behind the attack, and created fishbone diagrams out-
lining the cause and methodologies of phishing. The authors identified that
the motivation of the phishers is primarily financial gain, with other motivat-
ing factors including identity theft, identity trafficking, industrial espionage,
malware distribution, password harvesting, fame, and notoriety.
Abad[59] studied the economic and social environment of phishing net-
works. By analyzing phishing emails, messages from phishing-related chat-
rooms, and chatroom networks, the author presented an analysis of phishing
infrastructure beyond what was normally observable by victims. By crawl-
ing IRC, the authors uncovered a maximum spanning tree of chat channels
related to phishing, which were used by phishers to buy and sell stolen cre-
dentials, as well as to control botnets. The author also presented a flowchart
of the phishing process, starting from the discovery of vulnerabilities and
ending with cashing out. Cashing out was either done through the selling
of the stolen credentials or through the services of cashers, who often play
no role in the obtaining of credentials but have the capability to obtain cash
using the stolen credentials. The author indicated that the preferred cashing
out method for stolen banking credentials was ATM fraud, where the casher
would encode the banking information onto an ATM card and withdraw the
maximum daily funds from the account.
Herley and Floreˆncio[60] argued that phishing is far from a path to riches
and appears to be a low-skill low reward business. The authors showed that
the economics of phishing are subject to the tragedy of the commons, where
the pool of dollars (reward) shrinks as a result of the efforts of the phishers.
The author applied open access economic theory to phishing, and found that
the total dollars lost to phishing is equal to the total cost in terms of income
opportunity that phishers gave up in other occupations. In other words, the
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average income for a given phisher is estimated to be equal to or slightly
less than what he would have made at another occupation that required the
same level of skill. Another point that the author made was that as phishers
put more effort into the endeavor, the total revenue falls rather than rises,
suggesting that increasing volumes of phishing efforts imply a decreasing
total revenue for phishers.
Overall, the monetary gain in the phishing ecosystem is based on supply
and demand, in which phishers sell the harvested credentials to the cashers,
who then use those credentials to withdraw money from banks. Economic
theory suggests that the economy of phishing is subject to tragedy of the
commons, where more effort put into phishing results in a decrease in the
pool of resources, which in this case is the amount of phishable dollars.
Open access economic theory also predicts that, on average, the income for
a given phisher is no better than what he would have made in other honest
occupation.
3.4.5 Others
The following literature discuss other characteristics of phishing that do not
fall into the categories above.
Soni et al.[61] showed how a phisher could easily construct a phishing
website by downloading the source code of the target web page and making
a small modification to create a phishing web page with PHP. The authors
also discussed how a chromeless popup can be used to obfuscate the location
bar and security indicators in a browser’s chrome.
Bursztein et al.[62] studied manual account hijacking and provided evi-
dence supporting the hypothesis that phishing is the primary way for manual
hijackers to steal credentials. In order to measure hijackers’ response times,
the authors manually submitted 200 fake credentials into a random sample
of 200 phishing pages that explicitly ask for Google credentials and found
that 20% of these accounts were accessed within 30 minutes of submission
and 50% were accessed within 7 hours. Surprisingly, the hijackers spent on
average 3 minutes to assess the value of the account, and did not attempt to
exploit accounts that were deemed to not be valuable enough. The analysis
of the IP addresses used by the attackers revealed the systematic efforts made
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in order to avoid detection, with each IP address accessing only 9.6 accounts
on average over a period of two weeks.
Weaver and Collins[63] applied capture-recapture analysis to phishing feeds
to estimate the size of the phishing population. By computing the overlap
between the two phishing feeds and applying capture-recapture analysis, the
authors were able to estimate the number of unique phishing campaigns and
identify /24 netblocks that hosted a high concentration of phishing websites.
3.4.6 Summary
Overall, the works in this section discuss how phishers use search engines to
locate and exploit vulnerable machines, forward stolen credentials to email
dropboxes, and make money from the stolen credentials. Phishers carefully
craft search engine queries that allow them to locate vulnerable hosts with-
out having to scan the IP space, and these vulnerable hosts are shown to be
repeatedly exploited until they are patched. Phishers who use phishing kits
often have to specify a email dropbox to receive the credentials, and the cre-
ator of these kits often put a backdoor into the program that allows them to
receive the stolen credentials as well. Phishers then sell the stolen credentials
to cashers, who use the information to withdraw money from the victim’s
bank account. Some results also indicate that, due to the open economic na-
ture of phishing, the phisher are earning no more than what they would earn
from legitimate occupation. Other works also show how to quickly create
a phishing website, analyze manual account hijacking attacks, and estimate
the unique number of phishing campaigns.
3.5 Victim Profiling
In the previous sections, we have established several knobs that phishers
could exploit in order to increase the effectiveness of their attacks. In this
section, we explore characteristics of victims that could potentially be tar-
geted by phishers in order to increase the effectiveness of their campaigns.
Specifically, we want to examine if there exists a group of users with spe-
cific characteristics that the attackers can target in order to increase the
yield from their attack. These characteristics include demographic factors,
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behavioral factors, and personality factors.
3.5.1 Demographic Factors
Demographic factors such as age, gender, and level of education were dis-
cussed in many works as factors that may influence phishing susceptibility.
While many of the studies did not report any significant correlation between
demographic features and susceptibility, the works that are discussed here
were able to identify correlation between the user’s age, gender, and phishing
susceptibility.
Sheng et al.[64] evaluated demographic factors in phishing susceptibility
and effectiveness of interventions. The study was hosted on Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk platform, where participants answered survey questions about
their background and their knowledge about phishing, completed a role-play
task, received one or more form of training, then completed a second role-
play task. They found that some demographic factors such as gender and
age played a role in phishing susceptibility. Namely, women were more sus-
ceptible than men and participants in the 18-25 age range were more likely
to become a victim than those of other age ranges. The authors suggested
that since younger people have a lower level of education, fewer years of ex-
perience with the Internet, less exposure to training material, and less of an
aversion to financial risks, they tended to be more susceptible to phishing.
Blythe et al.[13] performed four studies that investigated why people fall
for phishing. In the second experiment, an online survey was conducted
where the participants were asked to rate emails as phishing or legitimate on
a four points scale. The result indicated a significant difference in detection
accuracy between men and women, with men being more accurate, and that
this difference was most prevalent among the younger age group. In the third
experiment, a small qualitative study was undertaken to investigate whether
blind users were more vulnerable to phishing. Based on the use of screen
reading technologies to read email, the authors found that blind users could
often identify phish in the first few lines of the email.
Holm and Ericsson[40] performed two naturalistic phishing experiments at
a Swedish technology consulting company in the electrical power domain.
Demographic-wise, the only significant result found by the authors was that
28
older individuals tends to be less aware of security than younger individual.
This finding contradicted some of the earlier results, and the authors specu-
lated that perhaps the subject’s experience in IT was more of a contributing
factor than age.
While the results from these works showed that age and gender played
a role in phishing susceptibility, namely that women and younger users ap-
peared to be significantly more susceptible to phishing, another factor behind
these results may simply be the user’s experience with computer and the In-
ternet. Younger people have a lower level of exposure to phishing education
and fewer years of experience with the internet, thus may be more suscepti-
ble to phishing. The same reasoning can also be applied to the observation
that older individuals tend to be less security aware than younger individ-
uals: they may not have much experience with phishing and IT systems in
general.
3.5.2 Behavioral Factors
Several research works have been done to construct a behaviorally model
that accounted for the user’s cognitive processing of phishing emails. These
studies attempted to identify the behavioral factors that caused the users
to be more susceptible to phishing and offered suggestions to both users
and system designers about changes of the users’ behaviors that may reduce
phishing susceptibility.
Vishwanath et al.[65] proposed SCAM, a model that accounts for the
cognitive, preconscious, and automatic processes that may potentially lead
to phishing-based deception. The model was tested using two experiments
where phishing emails were sent to undergraduate students at a university.
The email contained an embedded link in the first experiment, and it con-
tained an attachment in the second experiment. The experiment’s result
revealed that heuristic processing of phishing email decreased the individ-
ual’s suspicion of the email, and individuals who believed that their actions
on cyber space were relatively safe tended to heuristically process emails.
Individual’s habitual patterns and beliefs about cyber risk also directly in-
fluenced suspicion, which in turn influenced susceptibility.
Vishwanath et al.[66] created an integrated information processing model
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of phishing susceptibility and validated it with a survey on a sample of in-
tended victims of a phishing attack. The survey result suggested that indi-
viduals get phished for two main reasons: because they do not adequately
process the information, and because of their media usage habits. Domain
specific knowledge had a limited effect when the users did not adequately
processed the information, as the application of these knowledge required
attention and elaboration. Users who received and responded to more emails
are more likely to be deceived because their established email habits caused
them to engage in little cognitive deliberation. This will make them more
likely to ignore nuances in the email that may have revealed the deception.
Hence, the authors suggested that creating safer email rituals may be a more
sustainable solution in the long term. The authors further investigated how
users processed a phishing email and examined how user’s attention to visual
triggers and deception indicators influenced their decision[67]. The results
indicated that attention to visceral triggers, attention to phishing deception
indicators, and phishing knowledge played a critical role in phishing detec-
tion. Namely, attention to visceral triggers (i.e. urgency cues) increased the
likelihood of responding to a phishing email, while attention to deception
indicators and phishing education decreased the chances of getting deceived.
Wright et al.[68, 69] identified behavioral components of successful decep-
tion detection in phishing context. The authors conducted an experiment in
which each participant received a phishing email emanated from the authors
asking for a sensitive information. The participants who expressed disbelief
in the phishing email were asked to participate in a follow-up interview. From
the interview, the authors found that while the participants do acknowledged
the source of the message, the subject line of the email added to its authentic-
ity and enticed the participant to open the email. Once opened, examining
the layout and language as well as the nature of the content aroused sus-
picion. Furthermore, the participants’ responses indicated that individual
factors and contextual priming encouraged the said suspicion. These results
implied that users should not ignore their feelings of apprehension while
choosing whether or not to comply with a phishing request, and that users
who were suspicious either through personality-based traits or knowledge-
based awareness tended to be successful at detecting deceptions.
Watters[70] modeled the trust behaviors of users based on habituation and
sensitization. Habituation model described the building of trust between the
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user and another entity, with the user’s level of distrust decreasing over time
as they interacted with the other entity. Once users were habituated to
trust the email, they responded to the message without an appropriate level
of cognitive processing. To encounter habituation, sensitization model pro-
vided one mechanism to rapidly increase distrust level in the user. When
an unanticipated stimulus such as a spoofed phishing email from a trusted
entity was presented to the user, their level of distrust in the entity would
sharply increase. However, more positive interactions between the user and
the institution gradually habituated the user again. In summary, users who
were habituated did not adequately process phishing cues in emails at suf-
ficient depths to detect the deception. Defensive mechanisms could utilized
the sensitization model to counter habituation by attempting to intervene
the user’s habituated response.
Dong et al.[71] introduced a model to visualize the interaction between
users and phishing attacks from the victim’s point of view. The model stated
that users made two types of decisions in user-phishing interaction. The
user first decided a series of actions to take, then decided whether to take
the next planned action. Both type of interactions could be further divide
into 3 stages: construction of the perception of the situation, generation
of possible actions, and generation of assessment criteria and choosing an
action. In the case of phishing, the phisher attempts to engineer two false
perceptions: the perceived participant and the perceived consequences. For
the generation of possible actions, the phisher conveniently provided the
victim with a “solution”, which was the action that was premeditated by the
phisher. Hence, the authors suggested that the construction of an accurate
perception was the key to detect phishing attacks. This implied that system
designers should focused on providing security tools or indicators that will
get the user’s attention before they constructed a false perception of the
situation.
Overall, heuristic processing of phishing emails was likely to decrease the
individual’s suspicion, as their domain specific knowledge had a limited effect
in this case because the application of these knowledge required attention and
elaboration. Individuals who believed that their action on cyber space were
relatively safe, and those who established habitual patterns were also less
likely to be suspicious of phishing emails. Hence, the results suggest that
the construction of an accurate perception of emails in the user is the key
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to detect phishing attack, which can be start by establishing a safer email
habit.
3.5.3 Personality Factors
The research works in this category aimed to identify correlation between
the users’ personality and their susceptibility to phishing. This was done
through the use of the Big-Five personality framework[72] and the Cognitive
Reflection Test[73]. The Big-Five framework is one of the most widely used
models for personality, and it consisted of five broad bipolar factors that
represent personality at the highest level of abstraction. The factors were
Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.
The Cognitive Reflection Test uses three questions to measure the test taker’s
tendency to override their initial response and engage in further reflection to
find a correct answer.
Parrish et al.[74] proposed a conceptual framework that utilized the Big-
Five personality traits as a way to determine user’s susceptibility to phishing
attacks. They proposed that the Openness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness
attributes directly associated with phishing susceptibility. People with these
traits are open to all experiences, like to surround themselves with other
people, and are trusting. Conscientiousness and Neuroticism, on the other
hand, were speculated to be negatively correlated with phishing susceptibil-
ity, as these traits were correlated with being able to follow guidelines and
reluctance to share information.
Alseadoon et al.[75] performed a naturalistic phishing experiment to de-
termine factors that affected user’s vulnerability to phishing emails. The
participants first took a survey about their individual factors, including the
big five personality test, then fake phishing emails were sent to the them.
The email requested the recipient to provide his private information either
by replying to the email or by clicking on a link in the email. The result
showed that a total of 7% of the participants fall for the phishing email, with
87% of the victims clicking on the link and the rest responding to the email.
The result also indicated that submissive users and users with low experience
with email were more likely to not suspect phishing emails, and that users
with high extroversion and openness were more likely to respond to phishing
32
requests.
Pattinson et al.[76] investigated the behavior response of computer users
when presented with legitimate emails and phishing emails. Only half of
the participants were informed that the purpose of the experiment was to
test their ability to identify phishing emails. The participants were also
asked to complete a demographic questionnaires, cognitive reflection test,
and a personality test. The results indicated that participants who were
more familiar with computers were better at approaching phishing email.
The more extroverted, more open, and less impulsive participants performed
better among the participants who were not informed about the true purpose
of the experiment. The participants who were informed about the purpose
of the study also performed significantly better than the uninformed group,
suggesting that constant reminder of phishing email threat could be helpful
to the users.
As part of their experiment, Kumaraguru et al.[77] also asked the partici-
pants to take the Cognitive Reflection Test, and found that participants with
higher score (correctly answered more questions) were more likely to click on
the links in the phishing emails from companies that they did not have an
account with.
These results indicated that, personality wise, it was inconclusive to de-
termine if users were more susceptible to phishing based on the Big-Five
personality model and the Cognitive Reflection test. Specifically, high extro-
version and openness were thought to be correlated with higher likelihood
of responding to phishing requests, but experimental results were inconclu-
sive. Similarly, users who scored higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test were
thought to be better at recognizing phishing emails because the high score
is correlated to being less impulsive, but the results from these studies were
conflicting.
3.5.4 Summary
In general, the only factor that was shown to be correlated to the user’s
susceptibility to phishing was habituation. When users are habituated to
their email rituals, they heuristically processed the information presented in
the email and thus become less likely to notice phishing cues in the emails.
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Demographic wise, women and younger individuals in the 18-25 years age
range were reported to be more susceptible to phishing, but this result maybe
skewed by factors such as their experience with phishing education and In-
ternet expertise. However, behavioral research suggested that for users to
be able to utilized their domain specific knowledge, they need to be paying
attention to the task at hand, which was usually not the case once users are
habituated to their email routines. Personality wise, there is no consensus in
term of the correlation between the results from either the Big-Five person-
ality test or the Cognitive Reflection Test and the test taker’s susceptibility
to phishing.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed research that studies characteristics of
phishing attacks. Researchers have identified many knobs that the phish-
ers could use to adjust the effectiveness of their phishing campaigns. Spear
phishing attacks are found to be generally more effective in terms of the num-
ber of victims, but they are also more likely to be recognized and stopped in
a shorter amount of time. Multiple alternative attack vectors were proposed,
with an emphasis on attacks specific to mobile platforms and DNS poisoning
attacks. Aspects of phishing beyond the actual attack are also discussed, in-
cluding how the phishers locate and exploit vulnerable hosts, retrieve stolen
credentials from the phishing websites, and profit from the stolen informa-
tion. Other works also explore an easy way to create a phishing website,
analyze an attacker’s behaviors in manual phishing attacks, and quantita-
tively estimate the size of the phishing community. Behavioral analysis of
the users revealed that the only factor found to be correlated to phishing
susceptibility is habituation.
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CHAPTER 4
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
In this chapter, we explore the current mitigation techniques proposed to
combat phishing. This includes the discussion of detection techniques, de-
fense techniques, and their evaluation. Detection techniques identify phishing
URLs, emails, and websites automatically based on the content of the media
without the need for actions from the end user. Defense techniques does not
automatically identify websites as phishing, but they assist the user in iden-
tifying potential phishing websites or propose new authentication protocols
designed specifically to counter phishing. Several anti-phishing tools are then
evaluated for their coverage and accuracy, and whether they can effectively
protect the users.
4.1 Detection Techniques
In this section, we explore mitigation techniques proposed to detect phishing
websites. The techniques outlined in this category relied on manual or auto-
matic analysis of the contents obtained through URLs, emails, and websites
without requiring users intervention. These techniques offered trade offs be-
tween coverage and accuracy, and thus occasionally designed to complement
each other.
4.1.1 Blacklist Approach
Blacklist is the most primitive form of defense against phishing attacks. In
earlier days, organizations such as PhishTank maintained a list of URLs that
were manually verified by humans to be hosting a phishing website. Various
security tools would utilized the list to warn users if they are viewing a
URL with prospectively malicious contents. Since the verification process
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was carried out manually, it incurred a substantial delay between the time
in which the URL was first discovered and when it is added to the blacklist.
Reducing this delay is a crucial task, as the users who will eventually click
on a link in a phishing email often do so within the first hours of the attack.
In an attempt to reduce the latency, several mechanisms were proposed to
speed up the verification process.
Wardman and Warner[78] proposed a method for automating the verifica-
tion process through usage of previous phishing websites. Their observation
was that components of phishing websites, such as images, css files, and
JavaScript files were more often than not reused, so a similarity matching of
the MD5 hash of the resources against those of known phishing websites can
be use to determine whether a suspicious website is phish without requiring
human inspection. The authors evaluated this method with a dataset of 236
phishing URLs, and revealed that the method can identify 30% of the phish-
ing URLs based on the matching of the MD5 value of the main HTML page,
and MD5 set matching has the potential to confirm 20% more URLs.
Prakash et al.[79] created PhishNet, a system that appropriated heuristics
to enumerate combinations of known phishing URLs to discover new ones.
PhishNet has two separate components: an oﬄine URL prediction compo-
nent and an approximate URL matching component. In the URL prediction
component, five heuristics were used to systematically generate new URLs
and verified whether the new URLs contained web pages that carries match-
ing contents to those web pages used to generate them. In the approximate
matching component, similar heuristics were applied to determine whether
a given URL was a phishing site when the URL did not exactly match any
URLs in the blacklists. This was done by first breaking the input URL IP
address, hostname, directory structure and brand name and matched them
against corresponding fragments from URLs in the blacklist to generate one
final score. If the score landed above a pre-defined threshold, the URL will
then be flagged as phishing. The authors evaluated PhishNet against 6000
URLs from a live feed by PhishTank, and found 18,000 new phishing URLs
from 1.5 million URLs generated by the URL prediction component. The
approximate matching component was evaluated with phishing URLs from
PhishTank and SpamScatter as well as legitimate URLs from DMOZ and
Yahoo Random URL generator. The system was able to classify the URLs
with less than 3% false negative rate and 5% false positive rate.
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Liu et al.[80] proposed Aquarium, a technique used to assist blacklist ver-
ification through clustering of similar phishing web pages and crowdsourc-
ing. Aquarium was developed on top of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system
(AMT) to collect human-verified label on phishing websites. To increase the
throughput of the system, the authors proposed the use of clustering algo-
rithms to create clusters of similar phishing web pages that can be verified
as a set instead of individually. This was done through usage of shingling
algorithm for similarity measure and DBSCAN for clustering. Through a
2-weeks evaluation of the system with 267 users, casting a total of 33,781
votes, the results showed a true positive rate of 95.4% and a 0% false pos-
itive rate. The best median time to label was 0.7 hours. A vote weighting
system, which assigned weight to each participant’s vote based on their past
performance, was also introduced and was shown to be able to reduce the
median time to label a URL down to 0.5 hours.
Several techniques were proposed to speed up the verification step of phish-
ing blacklists. Leveraging automation, a method used to discover new phish-
ing URLs based on known URLs in the blacklist, and a method for automatic
verification using MD5 matching were proposed. To speed up manual ver-
ification, a crowd- source verification system designed on top of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk was considered, and a web page clustering approach to
reduce verification latency was discussed.
4.1.2 Whitelist Approach
Contrary to blacklist, the whitelist approach aimed to create a list of websites
that were verified to belong to legitimate organizations. Creating a global
whitelist for all legitimate websites was impractical due to the massive num-
ber of websites on the Internet. Hence, the approaches in this section focus
on the generation and maintenance of user-specific personal whitelists.
Li and Helenius[81] performed a heuristic evaluation of five anti-phishing
toolbars: Google toolbar, Netcraft, SpoofGuard, built-in phishing prevention
in Internet Explorer 7 and IEPlug, which was a tool developed by the au-
thors that maintained a whitelist of websites to be protected and alerted the
user when they are on a website that may be impersonating those protected
website. One general result reported by the authors is that a combination of
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blacklist and whitelist approach granted more protection. Since the blacklist
approach was prone to false negatives, and the whitelist approach proposed
by the user was prone to false positive, the authors proposed that a scheme
that utilized both approaches could grant more protection. The authors also
noted that a client side tool should not relied solely on redirecting a user
away from the phishing website to a safe website because internet connectiv-
ity issues may caused the user to remained on the malicious website.
Cao et al.[82] proposed AIWL, an anti-phishing tool that automatically
maintained a personalized whitelist. The authors introduced a concept of
Login User Interface, which was a 5 tuples consisting of URL, list of resolved
IP addresses, DOM of the input widgets, hash of the website’s certificate,
and hash of HTTP form’s source code. When a user successfully login to a
website multiple times, the website was added to the whitelist. If the user
submitted credentials to a website that was not part of the whitelist, the
submitted information is intercepted and a warning is displayed.
Wang et al.[83] proposed APWL, an anti-phishing approach that utilized
a user-generated whitelist. APWL used pattern matching to detect sensitive
data such as a social security number and blocked the submission of the data
to websites that are not on the whitelist. Furthermore, APWL did not allow
the user to bypass APWL blocking except by manually adding the URL to
the whitelist. Performance analysis showed that the tool only incurred a
small performance overhead.
These whitelist approaches mainly relies on the users to specify the web-
sites that they trusted. Potentially unsafe actions on websites that are not
part of the whitelist are blocked. One possible problem with this scheme was
the overhead incurred to the user to initialize the whitelist. While it has been
proposed that the list of websites that a user frequents is relatively small,
a warning would still be displayed every time a user try to submit sensitive
information on a new legitimate website. This could potentially teach an
insecure behavior to the user. If the user sees a warning every time he tries
to submit information to a new website, he would soon ignore the warning
and simply perform the actions that will make the warning go away.
38
4.1.3 Heuristic Approach
Heuristic approaches determined the legitimacy of emails or web pages based
on the analysis of their content. They are originally designed to complement
blacklists, since blacklist-based approaches tend to be ineffective for fresh
phishing campaigns that have not been manually verified. From a survey of
related literature, heuristic approaches can be split into four main categories:
rule-based approach, search-engine assisted approach, content similarity ap-
proach, and visual similarity approach.
4.1.3.1 Rule-based Classification
Rule-based classification techniques are the simplest form of heuristic ap-
proach to phishing defense. They used a set of static rules to determine if
an email or a web page is part of a phishing attempt. The rules are often
constructed based on observation and analysis of the phishing media, and
they are manually crafted and weighted for use in the detection task.
Chen and Guo[84] proposed LinkGuard, an end-host based anti- phishing
system that detect phishing links in email. The heuristics used is based
on the information present in the <a> tag of the email, specifically the
anchor text and the href attribute. Some rules that were proposed include
mismatched domain name in anchor text and in the href attribute, IP address
in the href attribute, and URLs that use ASCII code encoding or special
symbols. One notable feature of LinkGuard was the use of heuristics to
detect cross site scripting in the target website. The URLs that were flagged
as potential phishing URLs were check against blacklists, or a similarity check
was performed against a list of likely targets in order to draw conclusions.
LinkGuard was evaluated against 203 phishing websites, and was able to
detect 195 of them.
Yu et al.[85] proposed PhishCatch, a heuristic-based phishing email detec-
tion tool. PhishCatch relied on a weighted average of the output from a set
of rules to classify phishing emails, and the rules were based on the character-
istics of links in the email, the message content, and the use of PhishTank’s
blacklist. Evaluation of PhishCatch on a dataset of 4804 emails, 3710 of
which were phishing emails, showed that PhishCatch could detect 80% of
the phishing email with around 1% false positive rate. The authors also
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showed that PhishCatch was able to detect many Phishing URLs that were
not part of PhishTank’s blacklist.
Cook et al.[86] proposed Phishwish, a stateless phishing filter. Phishwish
used a score computed from a weighted average of binary results from each of
its rules to determine the legitimacy of a website. A website was determined
to be phishing if its score is above a certain threshold. Evaluation of the
system with 117 unique emails, 81 of which are phishing, demonstrated that
the score range for the legitimate emails and phishing emails were distinct
enough that Phishwish could classify phishing emails with high accuracy even
with all the rules having equal weight. However, Phishwish’s rules relied on
the email to be in HTML format, and emails containing a large number of
advertisements and links may cause false positives.
Chou et al.[87] proposed SpoofGuard, a client-side anti- phishing tool that
warned users when requests for data maybe part of a spoof attack. Spoof-
Guard was implemented as a browser extension that used the suspicious web-
site’s domain name, URL, links, and images as well as the browser’s history
and the request’s HTTP referer to evaluate the likelihood that a suspicious
website is a spoofed website. SpoofGuard also intercepted and examined
form data submissions and alerted the user if they were submitting a creden-
tial associated with one domain name to another domain name. Spoofguard
was evaluated against fourteen phishing web pages that spoofed eBay, and
the results showed that Spoofguard correctly identified all spoofed web page
and also intercepted and displayed warning when sample eBay credentials
are entered.
Alkhozae and Batarfi[88] proposed a phishing detection scheme based on
analysis of the web page’s source code, including characteristics of URLs in
the page, loading of resources from other domains, email functionality, and
the use of popup windows. The detection heuristic weighted the results from
each rule, and outputted a number describing the probability that a web page
was a phishing web page. No evaluation of the system against real phishing
emails was presented.
Atighetchi and Pal[89] proposed PhishBouncer, an attributed-based phish-
ing defense system. PhishBouncer was implemented as a proxy that monitors
every HTTP requests and responses and used an ensemble of nine rules to
determine if a website was a phishing site. Furthermore, PhishBouncer also
had a probe module that could embed proactive detection behaviors into the
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proxy.
Overall, these tools detected phish based on rules that were constructed
from the observed characteristics of phishing emails or web pages. Various
characteristics of the domain names and URLs were mentioned in almost
all of the tools, suggesting that phishing URLs were observed to be deter-
ministically different from legitimate URL. However, this also means that,
from the phisher’s perspective, construction of a phishing URL that imitates
most aspects of the legitimate URL defined by these tools would allow him
to circumvent most of the tools in this category. Many classification rules in
this section were found to also be useful in detecting phish with the machine
learning classification tools.
4.1.3.2 Search Engine Assisted Detection
One observation that was often made in regard to phishing websites was that
they were visually similar to their target. This is a practical observation, as
the goal of a phishing web page is to trick the victim into believing that they
are on the website of the phisher’s target. Leveraging this observation, the
detection mechanisms in this category extracted keywords from a suspicious
website, and used them as query to a powerful search engine to determine
the websites legitimacy.
Zhang et al.[90] created CANTINA, an anti-phishing toolbar that used the
content of the page and a trusted search engine to detect phishing website.
CANTINA used the TF-IDF algorithm to identify the most important terms
in a web page, and these terms were used to generate a lexical signature
of that page. TF-IDF ranked terms based on their frequency in the given
document and general importance of the term over all documents. The lexical
signature was use as a query to a search engine, and if the domain name of
the current web page matched the domain name of any of the the N top
search results, then the web page was considered legitimate. CANTINA was
implemented as an Internet Explorer extension and evaluated against 100
phishing URLs and 100 legitimate URLs. The result showed that CANTINA
can catch about 97% of phishing websites with 6% false positive using TF-
IDF alone, and caught about 90% of phishing website with 1% false positive
when other heuristics are added.
Xiang et al.[91] proposed a hybrid phishing website detection method based
41
on information extraction and information retrieval techniques. Similar to
CANTINA[90], the method utilized keyword-retrieval using TF-IDF scoring
as query in a search engine. A web page was regarded as phishing if its domain
name did not appeared in the top N results. A new component added in this
method was the use of keyword-retrieval to identify the domain of the page’s
declared identity and compared it with the page’s domain by utilizing search
engine to determine legitimacy. Additionally, the author also implemented
a login form detection module that classify a web page that contained no
HTTP form as not phishing. The system was evaluated against a dataset
of 11449 websites, and the result showed that the method achieve a true
positive rate of 90.06% with a false positive rate of 1.95%.
Dunlop et al.[92] proposed GoldPhish, a browser plug-in that detected
phishing websites by leveraging optical character recognition (OCR) tech-
nology and a search engine. Specifically, GoldPhish used OCR to read texts
from the screenshot of a web page and submit them to a search engine. If
the domain of the current web page was part of the top results, then the
web page is determined to be legitimate. The system was evaluated against
100 phishing websites and 100 legitimate websites and achieved an average
98% accuracy rate, 0% false positive rate, and 2% false negative rate. The
main limitations of GoldPhish were page rendering delays from the OCR and
search engine lookups, vulnerability to PageRank manipulation attacks, and
limited performance on web pages with insufficient OCR extractable texts.
Sharifi and Siadati[93] proposed a blacklist generator that utilized keyword
extraction and a search engine to detect phishing website. This approach
relied on the extraction of keywords from the web page of the URLs presented
in the email, and the comparison of the domain name of the URL with those
from Google’s top search results. The authors did not propose an automated
keyword extraction scheme.
Overall, the approaches in this category consisted of a scheme to extract
keywords from the suspicious website and a search engine. If the domain of
the suspicious website matches that of the websites in the top search results,
then the website is deemed to be legitimate. Due to its construction, it
is possible for the phisher to game the system by influencing the keyword
extraction process or the search engine results. Namely, the phisher can
modify the TF-IDF of the web page by adding invisible texts or replacing
some of the texts with images. The phisher could also influences the search
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engine’s results by gaming it’s ranking system.
4.1.3.3 Content Similarity Detection
Content similarity approach, as the name implies, are phishing detection
techniques that identify phishing websites based on analysis of the website’s
content. Similar to the search engine approach, content similarity approach
leveraged the observation that phishing websites were constructed to be vi-
sually similar to their target and sometime even using resources from their
target. The techniques proposed in this category mostly aim to identify
phishing websites by comparing their contents to those of legitimate web-
sites’.
Ardi and Heidermann[94] developed AuntieTuna, a client-side anti-phishing
tool that utilized cryptographic hash of web page contents to detect phishing
web site. Leveraging the observation many phishing websites load contents
from its target, AuntieTuna identified phishing websites by first generating a
list of trusted website specific to the user, then split the DOM Object of each
web page into chunks separated by the < p > and < div > tags and stored
the SHA256 hash of each chunk. When a user visited an untrusted website,
AuntieTuna computed the cryptographic hash of the suspicious web page’s
contents and compared them to the content hashes of the trusted websites.
If the number of matched contents is above a threshold, then the website was
flagged as phishing and an active warning was displayed to the user. This
approach allowed AuntieTuna to detect 50 out of 124 phishing websites that
target PayPal with 0% false positive.
Afroz et al.[95] proposed PhishZoo, a phishing detection system that used
profile of trusted websites to detect phishing. A profile of a website was
defined to be a combination of different metrics that uniquely identify that
site, including SSL certificates, URL, HTML files, and extracted features
from logo. The profiles for trusted websites were generated and stored for
comparison against suspicious websites. Evaluation of the tool with a dataset
of 1000 phishing websites and 200 legitimate websites showed a true positive
rate of 90.2% and a low false positive rate.
Wardman et al.[96] described a content-based phishing detection system
based on the use of a cadre of matching algorithms modified for the task of
phishing detection. The aim of the system was to overcome phishers’ obfus-
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cation techniques that eluded simplistic hash-based detection by applying,
in addition to hash-based matching, two popular file matching and string
alignment algorithms: diff and ssdeep. phishDiff was a technique developed
by the authors based on the use of the diff command to compute the per-
centage of different lines in the main index file of a phishing website. ssdeep
was an implementation of a context-triggered piece-wise hashing algorithm
that employed rolling-hash technique to the fuzzy hash value for two files. A
technique called Syntactical Fingerprinting is also used to compare structure
components within files. The system is evaluated against 49,840 websites,
17,992 of which are phishing websites, and the result showed that phishDiff,
ssdeep, and Syntactical Fingerprinting achieved more than 90% detection
rate with a low false positive rate.
Liu et al.[97] proposed a phishing web page detection scheme that identified
the target of a phishing web page by using DBSCAN clustering algorithm on
a set containing the suspicious web page and all of its associate web pages.
Associate web page was defined as web pages which can be reached by a
forward link from the given web page, and web pages returned by a search
engine when query with representative keywords on the given web page. If
a cluster was found around the given web page, then the web page was
flagged as a phishing web page. The scheme was implemented as a windows
application and evaluated against 8745 phishing URLs from PhishTank that
target 76 companies, and 1000 legitimate web pages obtained from Random
Yahoo Link. The results showed an accuracy rate of 91.44% and a false
positive rate of 3.4%.
Xiang et al.[98] proposed an anti-phishing system that built on the shin-
gling technique, a near-duplication detection algorithm that measured simi-
larity between two web pages by calculating the percentage of matching n-
grams of the two web pages. The classification process of the system started
by comparing the suspicious website against a small whitelist of legitimate
web pages, then compared the suspicious website against a sliding window of
blacklist feeds by using the shingling technique. If the suspicious website was
flagged as phishing, a TF-IDF analysis similar to that used in CANTINA[90]
was performed to verify the result. The system achieved a true positive rate
of 67.5% with 0% false positive rate with TF-IDF filtering, and a slightly
lower true positive rate of 65% with 0.03% false positive rate when a slid-
ing window of two weeks worth of blacklist feed was used to speed up the
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detection process.
Rosiello et al.[99] developed DOMAntiPhish, an anti- phishing tool that
leveraged layout similarity between web pages to detect when the user in-
putted his credential into a fraudulent website. DOMAntiPhish extended
AntiPhish, which was an anti-phishing system that alert the user when they
entered their saved credential information into an unidentified website. DO-
MAntiPhish compared the DOM object of the suspicious website against
that of the saved website, and only raise an alarm if the suspicious website
is structurally similar to the saved website.
Wenyin et al.[100] proposed a framework for the discovery of phishing tar-
gets by utilizing semantic link network. The motivation for this work came
from the fact that many phishing identification tool required explicit phishing
targets for comparison-based detection, but none of the tools actually em-
ployed any phishing target discovery mechanism. Hence, the authors focused
on the application of SLN theory to explore target of phishing websites by
utilizing information from the forward links in the phishing web page and a
powerful search engine. In summary, a suspicious web page was determined
to be phishing if it established a strong association relation with other web
pages rather than itself. This was due to the observation that legitimate
web pages often contained a forward link loops with its neighbor web pages,
resulting in legitimate web pages having a strongest association location with
itself. The system was implemented with a web front end and was evaluated
with a dataset of 1000 phishing URLs from PhishTank and 1000 legitimate
URLs. The results showed a false negative rate of 16.6% and a false positive
rate of 13.8%.
Wenyin et al.[101, 102, 103] proposed an approach to detect phishing web
pages based on content similarity. The content similarity between two web
pages was measured in three metrics: block level similarity, layout similarity,
and overall style similarity. The detection process start with the decomposi-
tion of the suspicious web page into a set of salient blocks, which were blocks
which contain elements that are visually and semantically consistent within
the block but were distinguishable between blocks. The layout similarity
was computed from the weighted ratio of the number of matched blocks to
the total number of blocks. The overall style similarity was calculated based
on the style features such as font family, text alignment, background colors,
etc. If the similarity between a suspicious web page and a known legitimate
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web page was above a certain threshold, it was flagged as a phishing page.
The system was evaluated with a dataset of 8 phishing web pages targeting
6 legitimate websites, and found that the pairs of phishing website and its
target website have significantly higher values than other pairs, indicating
that the similar assessment metric is suitably defined.
Overall, the techniques discussed in this section all leveraged the content
similarity between phishing web pages and their target. One problem with
many of these approaches was the reliance on knowledge the website that
was the target of the phisher, which could cause scalability issues when the
system is deployed in the real world. Also, since the similarity between the
websites are computed based on the content, it is possible for a phishing
website to be crafted in such a way that its DOM object is significantly
different from its target, but the rendered web page is visually similar.
4.1.3.4 Visual Similarity Detection
The techniques in this category identified phishing websites based on their vi-
sual similarity to the target website. Contrary to content similarity approach,
visual similarity approach involved the visual comparison of the rendered web
pages instead of the underlying DOM object.
Chen et al.[104] proposed a visual similarity based anti- phishing scheme
based on discriminative keypoint features in web pages. The scheme used
Contrast Context Histogram (CCH) descriptors to capture invariant infor-
mation on the suspect page, then matched them with the descriptors of
authentic web pages that were usually targeted by phishers. The authors
designed a light weight version of CCH, called L-CCH, and used it for this
task. L-CCH extracted key points using grey-level information and a corner
detection method and used neighboring pixels’ relative brightness to define a
keypoint. The key points were then clustered together using k-mean to take
the spatial distribution of the matching key points into account.
Hara et al.[105] proposed a phishing detection mechanism based on visual
similarity that did not require information about the phisher’s target. The
approach leveraged the observation that many phishers often targeted the
same website, and most phishing websites often tried to closely imitate their
target website. This observation allowed for a detection mechanism based
on visual similarity between a suspicious website and a known phishing web-
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site. The design of the system included an image database that stored the
screenshot of websites along with its URL and a label. The label determined
if the website is legitimate, phishing, or unknown. A suspicious website was
visually compared to the websites in the database using ImgSeek, an image
search tool. If the similarity of the images exceeded a threshold value, then
the domain name of the suspicious website and the image was compared.
If the domain name for both websites were the same, then the label of the
stored image is returned, else the suspicious website is classified as phish-
ing. If no visually similar website existed in the database, then the website
was classified as legitimate and was stored in the database with unknown
label. The evaluation of the system showed an 82.6% accuracy with 18%
false positive rate.
Fu et al.[106] proposed a phishing web page detection approach that lever-
aged visual similarity between a phishing website and its corresponding le-
gitimate website. The approach worked by compressing the image of the
full rendered web pages into a small square image (e.g. 100 * 100 pixels)
And then a signature of the image was computed. Visual similarity between
signatures was then computed using Earth Mover’s Distance. The authors
evaluated the system against a data set of 10,272 legitimate web pages and 9
phishing web pages that target some of the legitimate web pages. They found
that the system can detect 8 out of 9 phishing web pages with a reasonably
low rate of false alarm.
Mensah et al.[107] proposed an anti-phishing system based on visual anal-
ysis. Their approach involved the use of visual analysis of the suspicious
web page (page a) compared to two other web pages on the same domain
reachable by a link on suspicious web page (page b and c). The idea behind
this approach was that the visual similarity between page b and c was used
as the baseline reference on how dissimilar the web pages are expected to
be, and the difference between the visual similarity between page a and c
was used as a feature for a machine learning classifier. Together with other
legacy features, the classifier was able to achieve an accuracy of over 90%
with 10-fold cross validation on a dataset of 70 phishing web pages and 70
legitimate web pages.
Medvet et al.[108] proposed a technique to identify phishing websites by
visually comparing its similarity to legitimate websites. The technique con-
sidered three features to determine page similarity: text pieces, embedded
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images, and overall visual appearance. These features formed a signature of
a web page, which was then compared to signatures of known legitimate web-
sites using measures such as Levenshtein distance between strings, 1-norm
distance between colors, and euclidean distance between positions. After the
comparison, a final similarity score was given for a each pair of websites,
and a website was flagged as phishing if the score was above a pre-defined
threshold. The authors evaluated this technique against a dataset of 27 pos-
itive pairs (phishing web pages) and 140 negative pairs (other legitimate web
pages). The result showed that the technique achieved a false negative rate
of 7.4% and a false positive rate of 0%.
Chen et al.[109] proposed a phishing web page detection based on visual
similarity. Unlike other visual similarity detection approaches that performed
similarity detection on a set of features from the website, this approach was
based on Gestalt viewpoint on human perception, which stated that images
were interpreted in a holistic fashion rather than as a set of distinct features.
Augmented with a concept of supersignals, which explained how human use
holistic interpretation of visual input to drive rapid and frequent decision
making, the authors demonstrated that visual supersignals can be encoded
by using compression function into simple numerical values, and the “dis-
tance” between these values can be considered as the perceived similarity
between two web pages. The evaluation of the proposed system on a dataset
of 320 phishing web pages targeting 16 legitimate web pages revealed that
the Normalized Compression Distance between a phishing page and its tar-
get brand was significantly different than the NCD between two different
legitimate websites. A smaller scale experiment yielded a 100% accuracy
rate.
Geng et al.[110] proposed a phishing detection mechanism based on fav-
icon recognition. Favicon is a graphic image associated with a particular
website, and phishing websites often forge the favicon of a legitimate website
in order to trick the users. The proposed mechanism detected the favicon
in a suspicious web page, then performed a visual similarity evaluation of
the favicon against a set of favicons from legitimate websites. Evaluation of
the system against a dataset of 3,642 phishing websites and 19585 legitimate
websites showed a 99.6% true positive rate and 2.79% false positive rate.
The techniques discussed in this section all leveraged visual similarity be-
tween phishing web pages and their targets. Each technique proposed a
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different comparison criteria to determine similarity of web pages. Similar
to content similarity approach, one problem with some of these techniques
is the reliance on the knowledge the websites targeted the phishers, which
could cause scalability issues in real-world deployment. Also, depending on
the comparison technique, the phisher can game the system and produce a
web page that is visually similar to the target to the human observer but not
distinguishable by the algorithms.
4.1.3.5 Summary
Overall, heuristic approaches relied on various elements of the phishing web
page or email to determine its legitimacy. Rule-based approaches involved
the derivation of rules based on characteristics that are unique to phish and
manual tuning to apply a weight to each of the rules. This approach is further
discussed in the machine learning classification approach, where the weight
of each rule can be determined programmatically. Search-engine assisted
approaches relied on keyword extraction techniques and a powerful search
engine to identify if the suspicious website is legitimate. Content similarity
approaches and Visual similarity approaches relied heavily on the observation
that phishing websites were almost always visually similar to its target, and
many of them required the knowledge of the target websites. The main
different between the two is that a content similarity approach examines the
similarity between the structure of DOM objects, while a visual similarity
approach examines the similarity between the images of rendered web page.
4.1.4 Machine Learning Approach
The research in this category explored the use of machine learning classifiers
to determine the legitimacy of suspicious contents. Similar to rule- based
heuristic approaches, the works in this area aimed to complement blacklist
based detection through content analysis. The features extracted from the
content that could be useful for classification purposes are manually identi-
fied, and machine learning algorithms were used to determine the effective-
ness of the features and assigned appropriate weight to them for classification
purposes. Based on the use of different phishing contents for feature extrac-
tion, the works in this category can be further classified into those that
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utilized URL features, email features, web page features, and other features
for classification.
4.1.4.1 Phishing Email Features
The research works in this section explored how machine learning algorithms
could be used to classify phishing emails. Mainly, the researchers focused on
identifying useful features that can be extracted from emails for classification
purposes, and identifying the classifiers that was most suitable for the task.
Chandrasekaran et al.[111] proposed a phishing email classification tool
that used a Support Vector Machine classifier and a feature set derived from
the email’s structural characteristics. A set of 25 features relevant to lan-
guage, composition, and writing characteristics of the email was proposed,
and simulated annealing algorithm was used to remove features that are con-
sidered noise from the feature set. A Support Vector Machine classifier was
trained and evaluated on a sample from a dataset of 200 legitimate emails
and 200 phishing emails gathered over a period of six months. The classifier
was able to achieved an accuracy of over 90%
Abu-Nimeh et al.[112] compared the performance of six machine learn-
ing classifiers for the task of predicting phishing emails. Each classifier was
trained on a dataset of 1171 phishing emails and 1718 legitimate emails us-
ing 43 features extracted from an email’s body and header. The authors
performed 10-fold cross validation on each classifier, and reported the av-
erage error rates over all 10 folds. They found that when the penalty for
misclassifying any emails are equal, Random Forests outperformed all other
classifiers. However, Random Forests also had the worst false positive rate,
so another round of the experiment was done where false positives are penal-
ized nine times more than false negatives. Logistic Regression outperformed
all other classifiers for the second experiment and Random Forests performed
the worst.
Saberi et al[113] proposed a phishing email classification technique that
used an ensemble of naive Bayes classifier, Poisson probabilistic theory, and
k-nearest neighbor algorithm. The goal of the classifier ensemble was to
distinguish phishing emails from scam and ham emails with feature vectors
generated using a “bag of words” approach. Evaluation of the ensemble
classifier was done on a dataset of 4500 spams, 1500 hams, and 529 phishing
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emails using the top 2400 most frequent words from these emails as features.
The result showed that the ensemble classifier performed better than any
of the three single classifier alone, achieving a 5.6% false negative rate and
0.08% false positive rate.
Fette et al.[114] proposed PILFER, a machine learning approach to phish-
ing email classification that can be deployed on the server side. PILFER used
a Support Vector Machine classifier and a set of 10 features extracted from
phishing emails. The authors evaluated PILFER using 10-fold cross valida-
tion against a dataset of 6950 legitimate emails and 860 phishing emails, and
found that PILFER achieves an overall accuracy of 99% with a false positive
rate of less than 1%. Further analysis also indicated that while PILFER
can be deployed in a stand-alone configuration, deploying it in conjunction
with with an existing spam filter such as SpamAssassin can improve the false
positive rates.
Basnet et al.[115] evaluated different machine learning algorithms for the
phishing email detection tasks. Using structure features of email defined in
other literature as well as novel features, the author evaluated several machine
learning algorithms with a data set of 3027 legitimate emails and 973 phishing
emails. Half of the dataset is used to train the classifiers, while the other
half is withheld for evaluation purposes. The results showed that although
the performance of all machine learning methods used is comparable, biased
Support Vector Machine and neural networks consistently achieved the best
results.
Bergholz et al.[116] investigated two model-based features derived from
emails and evaluated their ability to detect phishing emails. The first fea-
ture is the use of dynamic Markov chain classifier to classified the message
as ham or spam. This was done by creating two Markov chain generation
models, one for ham email and one for spam. The email was classified as
belonging to the model that has a higher probability to have generated it.
The second feature was the use of latent Class-Topic Model, a model that
identified clusters of words that tend to appear together in emails. Evalua-
tion of support vector machines classifier on these two features and a set of
basic features yielded an improvement in accuracy and false positive rates
over a previous work by Fette et al.[114]. The authors then improved upon
this work by incorporating a large number of features, most notably hid-
den salting detection, image distortion detection, and logo detection[117].
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The new features were evaluated with a sample of 3636 phishing emails and
16364 ham emails by using 10-fold cross validation, and the results showed
that salting features alone could identify phishing emails with an F-measure
of more than 90%. Overall, the best features from the system could achieve
an F-measure of 99.46%. Furthermore, results from a real-life deployment of
the system showed that the system could be tuned to perform well in a real
life setting both as a phishing filter and a spam filter[118].
Ma et al.[119] proposed a method to determine the provenance of phishing
emails by clustering them using orthographic features. Orthographic features
mainly consisted of style characteristics that are used to convey the role of
words and sentences, which for phishing email included features such as the
number of images, links, and fake HTML tags in email. A modified global k-
mean clustering algorithm was used to determine the clusters. Experimental
results on 2048 emails showed that orthographic features played an impor-
tant role in the clustering of phishing emails to determine its provenance,
especially after dimensional reduction by repeatedly omitting subset of the
features.
L’Huiller et al.[120] proposed a game theoretic data mining framework
and used it to build an adversary aware classifier for phishing detection. The
proposed framework utilized a Weighted Margin Support Vector Machine
with a game theoretic knowledge function. The incorporation of the game
theoretic approach allowed the classifier to change its parameters dynamically
as the game evolved, with the awareness of the adversarial environment.
Ramanathan and Wechsler[121] proposed phishGILLNET, a multi-layered
a server-side phishing detection system that employed Probabilistic Latent
Semantic Analysis, AdaBoost, and Co-Training. At its core, phishGILLNET
used PLSA, a technique for topic discovery that could handle both synonyms
and polysemys by mapping a high dimensional vector of word distribution in
a document to a lower dimensional vector of topic distribution. The mapped
feature vector was used by an EM classifier on the first layer and AdaBoost on
the second layer to perform classification. The third layer of phishGILLNET
utilized Co-Training, a technique that is used to generate label for unlabeled
data. Co-Training reduced the need for manual labeling of a large corpus of
data. The authors reported that phishGILLNET3 achieves an F-measure of
100% on a very large dataset of 400K emails.
Olivo et al.[122] proposed a technique to find the minimum set of features
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needed for a reliable performance by machine learning based phishing detec-
tion tools. The authors identified 11 features that are used in a majority
of literature and evaluated the effectiveness of their combinations using a
hill climbing approach. The authors observed a 56% reduction in processing
time when a set of 4 features are used instead of 11 with an insignificant de-
crease in detection rates. Hence, depending on the application, the defender
could choose a model that is suitable for their resource constraints without
a significant loss in accuracy.
Dewan et al.[123] proposed a machine learning based detection model for
spear phishing email that used social features extracted from LinkedIn. Since
spear phishing emails were context aware phishing attack that leveraged
information about the victim, the authors introduced nine features extracted
from the LinkedIn profile of the email’s recipient to be used in addition to
the features extracted from the email. However, the authors found that the
classifiers performed slightly worse with the feature set that includes social
features, which may be due to the limited amount from information that can
be gathered from LinkedIn.
Smadi et al.[124] proposed a phishing email detection model that used a
J48 decision tree classifier on 23 features generated from the header and body
of the email. Some of these features included the message ID domain, sender
domain, message type, number of links and characteristics of URLs in links.
The classifier was evaluated on a dataset of 4559 legitimate emails and 4559
phishing emails using 10-fold cross validation, achieving 98.11% accuracy and
0.53% false positive rate.
Verma and Rai[125] proposed a phishing email detection scheme that lever-
aged the Message-ID field in an email header. Message-ID are globally unique
for every email, and usually constructed from the timestamp and the local
host’s domain name. The format of each Message-ID is ¡LHS@RHS¿, so the
symbols ¡, ¿, and @ were removed as a pre-processing step, and each email
is left with two attributes: LHS and RHS. n-gram analysis was performed
on both LHS and RHS attribute and a new attribute was generated for each
length n combination of characters. A dataset of 4,550 phishing emails and
9,706 legitimate emails was used to evaluate several classifiers, and the results
indicated that RandomForest outperformed all other classifiers.
In general, although there is no consensus on the best features or classifier
to use for the phishing email classification tasks, most of the works in this
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section reported a very high accuracy rates with a reasonably low false posi-
tive rate. The features were commonly extracted from the email’s header and
message, but sometime external information such as social media profile or
classification result from other classifier such as Markov chain classifier and
latent topic classifier were also used as features. Each study proposed their
own set of features and identified the best classifier through an evaluation
process on a dataset consisted of samples from legitimate and phishing email
corpuses. One study identified many common features that were proposed
in other literature, then evaluated the effectiveness of subsets of these fea-
tures and found that using a subset of four features to does not result in a
significant different in detection accuracy.
4.1.4.2 Phishing URL Features
The research works in this section explored how machine learning algorithms
can be used to classify phishing URLs. The main motivation behind the limi-
tation of features to those extracted from the URL was to avoid the loading of
web pages for analysis of the content on behalf of the user because the action
may trigger a side effect on the website. The features used in these works
are mainly the characteristics of the URLs as well as the information from
other services such as WHOIS information and search engine’s PageRank.
Garera et al.[126] studied the structure of phishing URLs and found that it
was possible to tell if the URL belongs to a phishing attack by using features
derived from the structure of the URLs and it’s PageRank. The derived
features included binary features of whether the URL contains certain words
such as signin, login, and webscr, and binary features indicating whether the
URL matched one of the four phishing URLs types derived by the authors.
These URL types are URLs with IP address instead of hostname, URLs
with target domain name in the path, URLs with target domain name in
the subdomain, and URLs with unknown or misspelled domain name. By
evaluating a classifier with a dataset of 1245 phishing URLs and 1263 benign
URLs, the authors showed that the classifier with their feature sets had an
average accuracy of 97.31% with a false positive rate of 1.2%.
Ma et al.[127] proposed an online learning approach for detecting mali-
cious websites based on lexical and host-based features of URL. The authors
argued that an online learning method was more suited than batch learning
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systems because online methods could process large numbers of examples far
more efficiently, and could adapt to changes in malicious URLs and their fea-
tures over time. The proposed features include lexical features such as host-
name, TLD, and primary domain, and host-based features such as WHOIS
information, hosting location, connection speed, and blacklist membership.
These features are used by a number of different online algorithms including
perceptron, logistic regression, passive-agressive algorithm, and confidence-
weighted algorithm. Each classifier was evaluated against a continuous, real-
time feed of malicious URLs from a large web mail provider and a feed of
legitimate URL from Yahoo’s directory listing. The result indicated that
confident-weighted algorithm can be highly accurate with accuracy up to
99%, and that the retraining of algorithms continuously with new features
was crucial for adaptability with a constantly evolving stream of URLs and
features.
Ma et al.[128] proposed machine learning based phishing URL classifica-
tion approach that used features extracted from the lexical and host- based
properties of the URL. Some of these features included the IP address and
domain properties of the URL, length of various parts of the URL, number
of dots in the URL, and a bag of words feature for each delimited token
in the URL. Classifiers that were considered by the authors include Naive
Bayes, Support Vector Machine, and Logistic Regression. The datasets used
for evaluation include benign URLs from DMOZ and Yahoo Directory and
malicious URLs from PhishTank and SpamScatter. The result showed that
different data sets provide different feature distribution for the task of de-
tecting phishing URLs, and that the classifiers performed poorly when the
training and testing datasets came from different data providers. Hence, a
representative training data was deemed to be important for a real world
deployment of the system.
Bulakh et al.[129] described a phishing URL classification approach from
the perspective of a spoofed brand. The authors analyzed 260 newly verified
phishing websites from PhishTank and found that many phishing websites
interacted with the website of the brand that they spoofed in a number of
ways such as asset retrieval and credential validation. These interactions from
phishing websites could be detected based on a feature set extracted from the
URL in the HTTP referer field. Varieties of classifiers were evaluated with
the feature set using 5-fold cross validation on a dataset of 7100 phishing
55
URLs and 7100 legitimate URLs. The authors found that Random Forest
turned out to be the best classifier with an accuracy of 96.34% and a false
positive rate of 3.39%. Another experiment on a real-world dataset resulted
in a classification accuracy of 94.06% and a false positive rate of 6.08%.
Overall, while the classification accuracy for the works in this category
may not be as high as the classifiers that used features from the email or
the body of a web page, the reported results are promising. With the lim-
ited number of features, the phishers could circumvent detection by using a
reputable free hosting services or use a URL redirection services to hide the
real phishing URL. They could also carefully crafted the phishing URL to
avoid being detected. One interesting aspect reflected in some of the works
in this category was the exploration of the effect of using different data sets
for training and testing. When a classifier was trained using data from one
corpus and then evaluated with data from another corpus, the results in-
dicated that the classifier performed significantly worse. Moreover, results
from the exploration of online classifier suggested that a constant re-training
of the classifier with the most up-to-date data is needed to ensure accuracy.
These discoveries revealed the dynamic nature of phishing and implied the
need for a detection solution that could adapt to these changes over time.
4.1.4.3 Phishing Web Page Features
The research in this section explored the effectiveness of machine learning
algorithms for the task of phishing web page classification. Mainly, the re-
searchers focused on identifying useful features that can be extracted from the
content of the web pages and URLs for classification purposes, and choosing
the classifier that is most suitable for the task.
Pan and Ding[130] developed a machine learning approach to detect phish-
ing websites based on anomalies presented in the website’s identity. The au-
thors defined the identity of a website to be a set of words which uniquely
identify the website’s ownership in cyberspace. This identity was computed
by an algorithm that used keyword extraction techniques from information
retrieval literature. A set of features was generated based on the website’s
identity, and a classification of website was done by a Support Vector Ma-
chine classifier. The authors showed that the classifier was able to achieve an
accuracy of more than 90% when trained on a dataset of 50 phishing web-
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sites and 50 legitimate websites. However, the result also indicated that the
performance of the classifier relied heavily on the performance of the identity
extractor, as the false positive rate can get as high as 15% when the identity
extractor is used but remain less than 5% when the web page identities were
manually selected.
Miyamoto et al.[131] evaluated 9 machine learning algorithms using 8
heuristics features from CANTINA[90] to classify phishing web pages. The
features used in the evaluation are the age of domain, known images, sus-
picious URL, suspicious links, IP address, number of dots in URL, Forms,
and TF-IDF. The classifiers were evaluated with a dataset of 1500 phishing
websites and 1500 legitimate websites using 10 runs of 4-fold cross valida-
tion. The results showed that AdaBoost outperformed all other classifiers,
and seven out of the nine classifiers outperformed CANTINA.
Aburros et al.[132, 133] presented a model to classify e-banking phishing
websites based on fuzzy logic and data mining algorithms. Fuzzy logic is
a form of multi-value logic where the truth value may be any number in
the range [0,1]. The authors applied this concept to phishing by evaluating
e-banking phishing websites using rule-based classification based on these
fuzzy characteristics. 27 characteristics were extracted from the suspicious
websites and evaluated in a hierarchical rule- based classifier, with the out-
put being the labeling of the suspicious website as one of very phishy, phishy,
suspicious, legitimate, or very legitimate. The authors neither specified how
they identified the 27 base features nor how the evaluation rules were gener-
ated. It was also unclear how the line was drawn between each of the output
label.
Aburrous et al.[134] proposed an approach to detect e-banking phishing
websites using data mining algorithms. After conducted a social engineering
case study and a phishing case study, the authors identified 27 phishing fea-
tures and indicators then clustered them into six criteria: URL, security &
encryption, source code & JavaScript, Page Style & Contents, Web Address
Bar, and Social Human Factors. Using these features, the authors evalu-
ated six data mining algorithms with a data set of 412 phishing websites,
288 suspicious websites, and 306 legitimate e-banking websites using 10-fold
cross validation. The result showed that MCAR outperformed all other al-
gorithms. The result also revealed a significant relation between the “URL
& Domain identity” criteria and the “Security & Encryption” criteria in the
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classification task, and that “Page Style & Content” and “Social Human
Factor” criteria were insignificant in the classification task.
Whittaker et al.[135] described the design and performance characteris-
tics of a proprietary machine learning classifier developed to detect phishing
websites and maintained Google’s phishing blacklist. The system collected
web pages from users’ submissions and Gmail’s spam filters and extracted
a number of features based on the URL, hosting information, and rendered
HTML content. Some features that were highlighted in the paper included
Information about whether the URL contains an IP address or matches a
high profile whitelist, length of the host component in the URL, Google’s
PageRank of the URL, term frequency-inverse document frequency of the
website, the extent to which the web page link to other domains, and the
occurrence of specific words in URL. These features were used by a propri-
etary logistic regression classifier to make the final determination. The goal
of the system was to minimize the number of published false positive, and the
authors demonstrated that the system was able to correctly classified more
than 90% of new phishing web pages after training is finished with less than
0.1% false positives.
He et al.[136] proposed a phishing web page detection method that used
a Support Vector Machine classifier. 12 features were extracted from the
web pages, with 9 features adapted from Anomaly method[130], 2 features
from PILFER[114], and one feature from CANTINA[90]. The classifier was
evaluated with a dataset of 200 legitimate web pages and 325 phishing web
pages. With 50 legitimate web pages and 50 phishing web pages reserved
for testing, the result showed a 97.33% true positive rate and 1.45% false
positive rate. This result implied that the performance of a phishing website
detector can be improved by combining several different methods together.
Xiang et al.[137] proposed CANTINA+, an anti-phishing tool that im-
proved upon CANTINA[90] by introducing eight novel features and two
heuristic modules. CANTINA+ had three main components: hash- based
duplication remover, login form detector, and machine learning classifier.
The hash-based duplication remover’s aim was to detect phishing websites
that were generated by phishing toolkits, which would all have very similar
content. The second component was a login form detector, which classified
web pages without login form as legitimate. Lastly, the machine learning
component classified the web pages with the use of 15 features, 8 of which
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are novel features introduced by the authors. Some of these features are the
presence of domain name or brand name in unusual parts of the URL, inse-
cure HTML form, bad links, and the presence of the page’s URL in search
engine’s top results. After evaluating 6 machine learning algorithms, the
authors found that Bayesian Network classifier outperformed all other clas-
sifiers, and the final system could classify phishing websites with over 90%
true positive rate and less than 0.4% false positive rate.
Zhang et al.[138] proposed a novel phishing web page detection approach
that utilized textual and visual content of the web page to measure the sim-
ilarity between protected web pages and a suspicious web page. The system
consisted of three components: a text classifier, an image classifier, and an
algorithm that fused the results from the classifiers into one decision. A
Bayesian approach was used for the text classifier, and the image classifier
utilized Earth Mover’s Distance for determination of visual similarity. The
results from the two classifiers were then fused together using an approach
based on Bayesian theory. A large scale experiment was conducted to evalu-
ate the performance of each part of the system as well as the overall system.
The dataset consisted of over 65,000 web pages targeting eight legitimate
companies, and the results indicated that the system has very high accuracy
rate and low false negative rate.
Bottazzi et al.[139] proposed MP-Shield, a framework for phishing detec-
tion for mobile devices. MP-Shield was implemented as an Android applica-
tion service on top of TCP/IP stack, essentially acting as a proxy that inter-
cept outbound IP packets from both browsers and other applications. URLs
were extracted from the intercepted packets and evaluate against blacklist
APIs, and the web page content was fetched to be classify by a machine
learning classifier. Evaluation of the system showed a 89% true positive rate
with a 14% false positive rate.
Dong et al.[140] proposed a machine learning approach to detect phishing
websites based on features extracted from the site’s certificate. Some of these
features included the issue date and expiration date, information about cer-
tificate issuer, cryptographic algorithms, and certificate version. These fea-
tures were used by an ensemble of six machine learning algorithms, and the
final decision for the website was determined based on Average Probability
ensemble approach. The system was evaluated against a dataset of 95,490
instances from phishing websites and 113,156 instances from legitimate web-
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sites, and the result showed that Average Probabilities ensemble achieved a
precision of 93.6% and a recall of 94.2% for the phishing websites.
Nguyen and Nguyen[141] evaluated the effectiveness of five machine learn-
ing classifiers. The features that were used in the evaluation are the presence
of IP address in the URL, the presence of symbols in the URL, length of
the hostname, TF-IDF of the web page content, the presence of suspicious
link, the presence of forms, site popularity, and the age of the domain name.
A dataset of 4,420 legitimate websites from 5000best.com/website and 5,389
phishing emails from PhishTank were used for the evaluation. The result
indicated that lexical features of the URL contributed the least to the ac-
curacy, and Random Forest outperformed all other classifiers with a true
positive rates of 98.8% and a false positive rates of 1.2%.
Overall, results from the evaluations of classifiers and features in these
works showed that machine learning classifiers can very accurately classified
phishing web pages with reasonably low false positive rate. Some features
that were considered in most of these works were related to the URLs and
domain names of the web pages such as the age of the domain name and
various structures of the URL. Since these features were common across many
works, we can assume that they have a substantial weight in the classifiers.
This implies that one possible attack against these classification systems
could be to exploit a domain name with high reputation to host the phishing
web page. Another possible attack is to use phishing URLs that are not
distinguishable from legitimate URLs by the classifiers. Another observation
is that some of the proposed features relied on the phishing web pages to
load resources from its target, meaning that phishing websites should hosted
their resources locally to avoid detection.
4.1.4.4 Other Features
The works in this category proposed machine learning based phishing de-
tection systems that used novel features other than those extracted from
phishing emails, web pages, and URLs.
Moura et al.[142] created nDEWS: a new domains early warning system for
TLDs that detect malicious domain registration using unsupervised machine
learning algorithm. The motivation for the system came from the observation
that domains that were registered for malicious reasons tend to have a spike
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in the number of DNS queries over the first few days after their registration.
Based on this observation, nDEWS used k-means clustering algorithm on a
feature set extracted from DNS requests. The authors specifically chose an
unsupervised learning algorithm instead of a supervised learning algorithm
because they wanted the system to be able to detect a wide range of malicious
domain registrations.
Aggrawal et al.[143] proposed PhishAri, a machine-learning based real-
time phishing detection for Twitter. PhishAri utilized features extracted
from a URL and those specific to Twitter such as the age of the account, the
ratio between follower and followee, the presence of trending hashtags in the
tweets, and the number of mentions. Evaluation against a dataset of 1473
phishing tweets and 1500 legitimate tweets showed that PhishAri was able to
achieve 95.52% accuracy. PhishAri is implemented as a RESTful API with
a front- end browser extension for Google Chrome.
These research offers alternative detection vector for phishing campaigns.
Detection based on the domain registration system relied on the behavior
that phishers usually put the registered domain to use within a short period
of time, which could easily be circumvented if the detection time window is
known to the phishers. The development of phishing detection system for
Twitter suggests that phishers may be using social media as a new attack
vector to deliver malicious URLs, and many cues specific to Twitter were
identified that could entice the users to click on the links.
4.1.4.5 Summary
We have discussed machine learning based detection systems for phishing.
These systems take advantage of features extracted from URLs, emails, web
pages, and other relevant information such as search engine PageRank and
WHOIS information. Most of the features used by the machine learning
classifiers were identified from empirical analysis of captured phishing emails
and websites, and the classifiers were shown to perform well when the training
and testing samples are drawn from the same corpus. However, some works
have shown that when a classifier was trained using data from one corpus and
then evaluate with data from another corpus, the performance of the classifier
was significantly worse. Furthermore, results from the works that explored
the use of online classifiers suggested that constant re-training of the classifier
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with the most up-to-date data was needed to ensure accuracy. Since most
works evaluated their classifiers with cross validation techniques, this begs
the question about the accuracy of the techniques that use batch training
approach: how well does the system perform in real world deployment, and
how often does the classifier needs to be re-trained?
4.1.5 Network Level Approach
Network detection techniques for phishing are based on the analysis of net-
work traces from ISP standpoint. Most of the works focused on the detection
of fast- flux phishing campaigns. Fast-flux is a term coined in the phishing
community to describe a decentralized botnet with constantly changing DNS
records, which is used by phishers as proxies to hide the real phishing website.
This involved the use of domain names that resolved to a large number of
constantly changing front proxies to hide the “mothership” that hosted the
actual phishing website. Other works also explored efficient retrospective
detection of phishing URLs from network traces.
Zhou et al.[144] proposed a multi-stage decentralized collaborative intru-
sion detection system to detect and take-down fast-flux phishing campaigns.
Since the front proxies can be hosted across many ISPs, the authors proposed
a collaborative intrusion detection systems where each participating system
shared evidences of malicious front-end proxies from their subnetworks to
coordinate a detection of the mothership. The CIDS was build on top of
a structured peer-to-peer network for scalability and self-healing property
and used a publish-subscribe paradigm to accommodate frequent member-
ship changes. The system also used a multi-stage approach to allow each
participant to identify compromised hosts within their subnetwork.
Zhou et al.[145] proposed two approaches to correlate evidence of fast-flux
phishing domains: correlation of evidences from multiple DNS servers and
correlation of evidences from multiple fast-flux domains. To determined if
a domain was a fast-flux domain, we needed to observe that the number of
unique IP addresses belonging to that domain was above a certain threshold.
This involved multiple DNS query over time, so the authors proposed to speed
up this process by querying multiple DNS servers at the same time. Another
observation was that multiple fast-flux domains shared the same pool of IP
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addresses, so another model of fast-flux domain detection was proposed to
classify a suspicious domain as a fast-flux domain if it resolved to some IP
addresses that appeared in other fast-flux domains. Evaluation of the system
on real world data showed a substantial speedup in terms of the number
of queries needed for detection can be achieved and that a decentralized
architecture is more scalable than a fully centralized architecture.
McGrath et al.[146] proposed a machine learning based system to detect
fast-flux and DNS flux phishing attack. Using features generated from DNS
resolution of suspicious URLs over time and a Support Vector Machine as the
classifier, the authors found that 77.6% of fluxing web servers were part of
a double flux network, which implied that fast-flux phishing occurs not only
at the web server level but also at multiple levels in the DNS hierarchy. This
suggested that most phishers who uses fast-flux approach are well provisioned
against take-down efforts.
Li et al.[147] proposed LARX: a large-scale retrospective data exploration
framework that analyzed archived network data. To efficiently gather net-
work traces, the system recorded only the first 15 kilobytes of each connec-
tion, which was enough to record most connections in its entirely and enough
to record the most useful part of the longer connections. The archived data
were anonymized and then split into small chunks by tcpdump for processing.
TCP stream were reassembled using tcptrace, and URLs were extracted and
compared with a blacklist to identify phishing URLs. LARX’s performance
was evaluated on two cloud computing platforms, AWS and Eucalyptus, and
a physical server using 10GB of network trace data. The authors found that
the number of instances needed to process the data in a timely manner on
Eucalyptus is impractical, but it was cost-effective to deploy LARX on AWS.
However, LARX failed to find any phishing URL from the 10GB data trace
that was used for evaluation, which the authors attribute to the changing
coverage of blacklists.
Due to the nature of the fast-flux phishing campaigns, their detection re-
quired multiple DNS queries over time. Several works proposed a speed up
techniques for this detection process by utilizing distributed analysis of sev-
eral DNS servers, which required collaboration across ISPs. Results from
a DNS analysis of fast- flux domain also indicated that the domains that
were part of a fast-flux network were fluxing at the subdomain level as well,
which implied that fast- flux phishers were well provisioned to avoid detec-
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tion. Since fast-flux campaigns were identified by works in other areas to
be responsible for more than half of all phishing emails, an effective solution
for the take down of fast-flux campaigns would be very beneficial. Other
works also discussed how network trace analysis could be done efficiently
on cloud computing platforms and that retrospective discovery of phishing
URLs using blacklists may not be feasible due to a change in coverage.
4.1.6 Honeypot Approach
Maggi et al.[148] created a data collection system that captured informa-
tion about phishing campaigns with a particular focus on the voice channel.
The system consisted of four modules: a phone module that answers in-
bound phone calls and record resulting conversations, an email module that
collects spam and phishing emails, an IM honeypot that record unsolicited
IM messages, and a social network module that crawl social networks and
monitor suspicious accounts identified by the other modules. Collectively,
the data from the first three modules were processed using a simple natu-
ral language processing techniques to extract popular words and sentences.
Phone numbers and URLs were also extracted, and the URLs were resolved
with longshore.com API to retrieve its redirection chain for external analysis.
While the system did not explicitly identify phishing URLs, it supplied a list
of suspicious URLs that have a high chance to be phishing.
4.1.7 Summary
Overall, it is clear that different detection mechanisms have varying degree of
timeliness and coverage. Blacklist and Whitelist approaches required human
intervention to identify legitimacy of websites and offered 0% false positive
rates and 0% false negative rates. However, they suffered from high la-
tency between the time when the website is discovered and the time when
a decision is made. Many techniques were proposed to speed up the verifi-
cation latency of blacklists, including the discovery of similar phishing web
pages and the clustering of suspicious web pages to be identified at once. For
whitelist based approaches, various personal whitelist schemes were proposed
to mediate the impracticality of a single global whitelist. To complement the
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list-based approaches, heuristic and machine learning based approaches that
do not require human intervention were proposed. These approaches offered
fast detection of new phishing websites but suffered from a small number
of misclassifications. While a small number of misclassifications may seem
negligible, a misclassification of a legitimate website as phishing can severely
damage the reputation of the website and should be avoided at all cost. Some
forms of phishing attacks such as fast-flux cannot be efficiently detected
locally, so collaborative network level detection techniques were proposed.
Methods for automatic discovery of suspicious URLs were also discussed,
which could improve coverage of list-based detection approaches.
4.2 Defense Techniques
This section explores mitigation techniques that have been proposed to de-
fend the user against phishing websites. Specifically, the techniques in this
category required actions from the users in order to be effective. These ac-
tions can range from the user simply acknowledging a warning displayed by
the tool, to a complete change in authentication behaviors.
4.2.1 Offensive Defense Approach
The works in this category aim to detect phishing websites based on the site’s
response to a submission of a fake credential, and inconvenience the phisher
at the same time. By submitting fake credentials that are indistinguishable
from real credentials, the tool is actively polluting the phisher’s database.
Most approaches in this category leverage the observation that just as end
users cannot tell legitimate and spoofed emails apart, phishing websites also
cannot easily distinguish the real and fake credentials apart. These fake
credentials can also be used as honeytokens to alert the target when the
phisher tries to verify the credentials on the target’s website.
Yue and Wang[149, 150] proposed BogusBiter, a defensive strategy that
submits a large amount of fake credentials that are indistinguishable from
real credentials to phishing websites, with the goal of pollute the phisher’s
dataset. This will force the attackers to verify the stolen information, in
which case the bogus credentials may also be used as honeytokens to alert the
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target institution when the phisher attempted to verify the stolen credentials
on the target website. BogusBiter is deployed as a web browser extension,
and utilized other phishing detection components of the web browser to de-
cide whether to submit the bogus credentials or not. BogusBiter is evaluated
against a dedicated testbed to verify the indiscernibility of the bogus cre-
dentials, and against 50 phishing websites and 20 legitimate websites. The
results show that the submission of the bogus credentials is not discernable by
the phishers at the TCP connection level, and that BogusBiter successfully
submitted the bogus credentials to all 50 phishing websites.
Chandrasekaran et al.[151] proposed PHONEY, an anti- phishing approach
that send fake information to suspicious websites to determine its genuine-
ness. PHONEY is designed to sit between the mail transfer agent and mail
user agent, processing user’s emails and discard phishing emails before they
reach the user’s inbox. PHONEY probed the user’s emails and if a form is
present on the email or on the web page with a link in the URL, fake informa-
tion matching the input type is submitted in the form of active honeytokens.
The behavioral response of the website is recorded and analyzed by a rule
based system to deduce if the response is consistent with those of legitimate
websites. PHONEY was evaluated against 17 phishing emails and a number
of legitimate emails, and detected all phishing emails with 0 false positives.
The authors also boldly claimed that PHONEY was able to successfully de-
tect all email based phishing attacks listed on the antiphishing.org archive
at the time of writing.
Joshi et al.[152] proposed PhishGuard, an anti-phishing browser plug-in
that identifies phishing websites by submitting random credentials before
the actual credentials during the login process. PhishGuard captured the
credentials that the user intended to submit to the website and first submit
a number of credentials with the same username but a randomly generated
password to the website. The expected response of the legitimate website to
these random credentials is a 401 authentication error, in which case the real
credential is then submitted. However, one weakness of this scheme is when
the phishing website always responds with a 401 authentication errors, in
which case PhishGuard will continue to submit more random credentials in
an attempt to obfuscate the real credential. Since PhishGuard does not store
the credentials of the user, it can raise a false alarm when the user mistyped
his credentials.
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Li et al.[153] presented an anti-phishing framework based on the use of
spamtraps and honeytokens. The proposed frameworks utilized four differ-
ent components: fake credentials to be used as phoneytokens, spamtraps for
gathering of phishing emails, phoneybots that routinely submit phoneyto-
kens to the websites, and a honeyed e-banking system that is modified to
act as a honeypot when a honeytoken is used to login to the system. The
key idea behind the system is for phoneybots to imitate a human user and
periodically login to the honeyed e-banking system and perform money trans-
fer transactions. This allows pharmers and malicious software to steal the
phoneytokens using DNS poisoning or keyloggers. When the attackers login
with the honeytokens and attempt to transfer money into their account, the
system will detect the transaction and the unknown account will be flagged as
a malicious account. The financial institution can then alert their users who
recently transferred money, to the flagged accounts, or give the information
to law enforcement agencies.
Knickerbocker et al.[154] proposed Humboldt, a distributed system that
poisons phishing websites’ database by submitting fake credentials en masse
to the phishing websites that are indistinguishable from legitimate creden-
tials. The distributed nature of Humboldt makes it harder for phishers to
filter out fake credentials based on the origin of the submission. Humboldt
also uses a submission pattern that is undetectable to the phisher based
on the coordination of multiple Humboldt clients by a central server. The
central server creates a profile of phishing website for each URL in a feed,
identifies the type of data requested and submission method, and stores it in
a database (HumboldtDB). The server also generates the fake information,
then distributes them to the Homboldt clients for submission. The client
attempts to submit the given credentials to a phishing website, and reports
back to the server. To defend against Humboldt, the phisher could use phish-
ing URLs with unique parameterization, introduce malicious clients into the
pool, or attack the Humboldt server.
Shahriar and Zulkernine[155] proposed a PhishTester, a phishing website
detection scheme based on a trustworthiness testing approach. Trustworthi-
ness testing of a website is unlike a test where the website is tested against
a known input for expected outputs. It instead revolves around checking
whether the behavior of the website matches our knowledge of the behaviors
of phishing or legitimate websites, in order to determine if the website is legit-
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imate or phishing. Specifically, the authors model the behaviors of phishing
and legitimate websites as a finite state machine, and develop heuristics based
on state, submission response, and form-based features to test the websites.
PhishTester is implemented in Java and has been evaluated against 33 phish-
ing websites and 19 legitimate websites. The result shows that PhishTester
can classify all websites correctly. Furthermore, PhishTester can also detect
phishing websites that exploited cross site scripting vulnerabilities in trusted
websites.
McRae and Vaughn[156] proposed an approach to track down the phisher’s
workstation by utilizing honeytokens and web bugs. Web bugs are HTML
image tags that contact a web server with a unique parameter when the web
browser tries to render the image. This approach was previously used by
spammers to identify active emails addresses. In this work, the authors pro-
posed the submission of web bugs as honeytoken into the form on a phishing
web page, with the goal of extracting the phisher’s IP address and access time
if they view the stolen information in an HTML enabled environment such
as a webmail client. To evaluate this framework, the authors submitted the
web bugs to 11 phishing web pages and received two referrals. The referral
contained the IP address of the phisher’s workstation, the time at which the
information was accessed, the browser’s agent string, and the URL that re-
quested the image. The authors further discussed the easy countermeasures
that the phisher could employ such as the use of text viewer or disable the
loading of images.
Many techniques are proposed in this section that actively submit fake
credentials to suspicious websites, and some of them identify the phishing
websites based on the response to the submission of fake credentials. While
this approach will not stop victims from giving their credentials to the phish-
ers, it will make it riskier for the phisher to operate and reduce the poten-
tial financial gain from the attacks. However, phishers can circumvent the
response- based detection method by responding with the legitimate website’s
response to the wrong input by default, or utilize robot detection schemes
such as CAPTCHA, or use JavaScript to grab the credentials before they are
submitted. Also, there is a possibility that the user may be locked out of
their account as a result of the tool making too many failed authentication
attempts, so the legitimate websites may have to increase their maximum
tolerance on failed authentication.
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4.2.2 Credential Tracking Approach
The works in this category aims to prevent the users from submitting their
information to a phishing website by keeping track of the users’ information
and alerting them when they try to submit the tracked information to a new
website. Most of the defense in this category are implemented as a browser
plugin or toolbar, and some of them require the users to change their Internet
browsing habit.
Kirda and Kruegel[157] created AntiPhish, an anti-phishing browser ex-
tension that display a warning to the user when they attempt to submit a
saved credential to an untrusted website. After AntiPhish is installed, the
user is prompted to set a master password that will be used to encrypt the
stored credentials using DES. After this initial setup, AntiPhish can capture
and store form information and a mapping to the domains where the infor-
mation is submitted. Whenever the user enters information that matched
the previously captured information, AntiPhish checks the domain of the
website and assumes the website is malicious if its domain is not among the
stored domains. AntiPhish is configured to disable Javascript on the website
when the user starts typing information into a form, then enable it after the
form information is verified to circumvent malicious JavaScript from stealing
the information. AntiPhish is implemented as a Firefox extension, with an
implementation for Internet Explorer planned.
Wu et al.[158] proposed Web Wallet, an anti-phishing browser sidebar that
deterred phishing attack by determining where the users intend to submit
their sensitive information and alert the users when the current website does
not match their intended website. The sidebar worked by disabling any login
forms on a web page, forcing the user to use a specific keyboard shortcut to
open a Web Wallet interface to submit their information. This interruption of
the user’s workflow caused the user’s attention to be focused on Web Wallet,
which will present a warning to the user if they are trying to submit sensitive
information to an unfamiliar website. The authors evaluate the effectiveness
of Web Wallet by conducting a role-play experiment with 21 subjects. The
authors found that Web Wallet significantly lowered the spoof rate of normal
attacks from 63% to 7%.
Yee and Sitaker[159] created Passpet, a password management and phish-
ing protection system implemented as a browser extension. Passpet automat-
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ically fills in unique passwords for every website based on the user’s master
secret and the website’s label. Using password hashing, the users only have
to memorize one master secret, which will be combined with a user-specified
label to create unique passwords for the websites. Petnames allow the user
to assign a local label to objects, then translate global identifiers for objects
into the user’s local petnames to make sure that they are on the intended
website. Passpet also generates a random animal icon and name for each
user, making it harder for attackers to spoof the Passpet interface. Passpet
alerts the user when they have entered a label to fill in a password for a
website that was not assigned by the label, and effectively breaks the user’s
habit of entering passwords into websites by making it convenient for them
to use Passpet’s UI to fill in the password.
Florencio and Herley[160] proposed a phishing detection system that tracks
user’s passwords re-use behavior at unfamiliar websites. The system con-
sisted of a browser toolbar and a server. The browser toolbar tracks sub-
missions of user’s credential for whitelisted websites on unfamiliar websites
and report it to the server. These reports contain the domain name of the
whitelisted website and the suspicious website, which the server then aggre-
gates across all users and identify pairs of phishing websites and its target
according to pre-defined rules. The server then contacts the phishing tar-
get and alerts them of the users who were phished. While this scheme does
not prevent the phisher from obtaining the victim’s credentials, it can then
mitigate the damage before the credentials are used.
Bin et al.[161] proposed a DNS based anti-phishing and anti-pharming sys-
tem specifically designed to protect credit card numbers and login creden-
tials for financial accounts. The system consists an information server, and a
browser toolbar. The information server hosts a Bank Information Database,
which stores the range of credit card numbers allocated to a specific bank
along with the bank’s name, IP addresses of the bank’s DNS server, and IP
addresses of other websites that are allowed to access the card number. The
browser toolbar periodically queries the database and stores the data locally.
The browser toolbar intercepts packets that contain a digit string that has
the format of a credit card number, and performs a reverse DNS lookup on
the destination IP address. If the destination IP address belongs to the bank
or the trusted websites, then the information is allowed to be submitted, oth-
erwise a warning is displayed to the user. If the user indicates to the warning
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that he is submitting a credit card number, then the website is determined
to be a phishing website, and the toolbar prevents the submission of the card
number.
In general, the tools proposed by these research works track the submis-
sion of user’s information and alert them when they try to submit the same
information to a new website. Since most of these tools are implemented as
a browser add-on, one attack that the phisher could launch against the tool
is to spoof the tool interface as part of the web page. This is recognized
by some tools such as Passpet, which counters this attack by not having a
default behavior that can easily be spoofed. Some of these tools also require
a change of behavior from the user, which would make their interaction more
secure but may prove to be a barrier of entry for some users. Also, if the
tool displays warnings on many legitimate websites, which may be the case
if the users re-use their passwords, the users may become habituated to the
warnings and simply ignore them.
4.2.3 Novel Authentication Protocol
The techniques in this category attempt to defend the user from phishing
websites by proposing alternative authentication protocols. While some of
the protocols are deployed on the server side and simply provide an integrity
check to the user, many of these protocols have implementation on the client
side, which may require the users to actively use the tool in order to be secure.
The actions required by the user ranges from inputting their credentials in a
specified area, to physically pushing the power button on their phone every
time they want to sign in to a website.
Herzberg and Jbara[162, 163] created TrustBar, a secure user interface
implemented as web browser add-on. TrustBar displays the identity of the
website from its SSL certificate along with the name of the certificate au-
thority who identified the site. When the website is not protected by SSL,
a warning message is displayed instead. The name of the website and the
name of the certificate authority can be substitute by brand icons or images
selected by users to help them identify the websites that they frequent.
Dhamija and Tygar[164] proposed a new class of Human Interactive Proofs
(HIPs) that allows a human to distinguish one computer from another. The
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challenge in this model must be easy for a particular class of computers to
pass, but hard for other computers even after a number of successful au-
thentications were observed. This class of HIPs can be used by humans to
distinguish a known legitimate website from an unknown one, which would
be useful in the detection of phishing attacks. The authors then show that
Dynamic Security Skin, a scheme proposed by the authors, satisfies all re-
quirements for the proposed class of HIPs[165]. The client-side of the scheme
was implemented as a browser extension to Mozilla Firefox that provides a
trusted windows dedicated to username and password input to all websites.
Once the user is authenticated, the browser generates a “skin” that is unique
to each user and transaction, and displays it as some element on the web
page. The browser extension also computed and displayed the same image
independently, allowing the user to easily verify the content from the server
visually.
Topraka et al.[166] proposed ViWiD: a server-side phishing defense mech-
anism that embeds a timestamp and a personalized secret word chosen by
the user to the website’s logo before serving it to user. The unique water-
marking allows the user to verify the integrity of the legitimate website, and
thwart the “one size fit all” phishing attacks that spoof legitimate websites.
However, it is unclear if this scheme is secure against phishers who display
resources directly from the target website.
Parno et al.[167] proposed an anti-phishing system that forces the user to
enter their credentials through a trusted device. The system consisted of a
browser extension and a mobile phone application. Once the registration pro-
cess, which required a nonce to be sent securely to the user, is done, the user
must authenticate via the established public key pair and username/password
combination, which is only available when the user initiates the connection
on the phone. While this approach may not prevent the users from disclosing
their credentials to phishing websites, it will prevent the attack from directly
utilizing those stolen credentials on the servers that implemented this system.
Gouda et al.[168] proposed SPP, an anti-phishing single password protocol
that allowed the user to safely use one password on all websites. The proto-
col consisted of three messages: the user sends his username to the server,
the server replies with a stored challenge specific to the user, then the user
responds with a one-time server-specific ticket for that challenge and a new
set of challenge and ticket verification information. The implementation of
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the SPP revolved around the use of a random number as the challenge, and
the result of a one-way hash function on the number, password, and server
identifier to produce a ticket and its verifier.
Tout and Hafner[169] proposed Phishpin: an anti-phishing approach that
utilizes mutual authentication to detect phishing websites masquerading as
legitimate websites. Phishpin uses partial credentials sharing and client fil-
tering techniques to enable both users and other entities to mutually prove
their identity to each other without divulging sensitive information during
the process. After certificate validation, the user authenticates oneself to the
server by constructing a string that contains one half of the hash of their
password, a shared secret value, and a challenge phrase. The hash of the
constructed string and the challenge phrase is then sent to the server. On
the server side, the plug-in validates the hash with the challenge phrase and
the stored user’s information, then authenticate itself to the user in a similar
fashion using the hash of the other half of the user’s password.
Oiwa et al.[170] proposed a password based mutual authentication protocol
that can prevent various kind of phishing attacks. The protocol is based on
the PAKE cryptographic scheme, which stands for Password-Authenticated
Key Exchange. With this protocol, if the user is connected to a phishing
site that doesn’t know the user’s password, then the mutual connection will
not succeed, and the submitted information will not allow the phisher to
access the user’s account on the legitimate website. One possibility of an
attack against the protocol is to forge the UI dialog that asks for the user’s
password, and the authors suggest the use of an extension to the browser
that has dedicated password input field instead of dialog.
Crain et al.[171] proposed Trusted Email, an anti-phishing tool that uti-
lized public key cryptography to sign emails from trusted sender. Using
public key cryptography, Trusted Email allows legitimate companies to es-
tablish a key and self-sign certificate with their customer. All future emails
from the trusted company are signed with the company’s private key, which
allows the user to verify its signature with the established public key. The
authors implement the system with a Java proxy server and a plugin for
Mozilla Thunderbird, demonstrating that the system can be implemented
without modification to the current internet architecture.
Jakobsson and Siadati[172] proposed SpoofKiller, a web browser mecha-
nism that attempts to modify the user’s login behavior. The implementation
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of the system forced the user to push the physical power button on their
phone when they want to login to a legitimate website, which will signal
the browser to verify the website’s identity. SpoofKiller is implemented as a
web browser on Android OS and a usability study was conducted. The par-
ticipants in the study used SpoofKiller to login to a website everyday, and
on the last day the website asked the participant to not perform the action
and type in their email password instead. The result showed that 30% of the
participants pressed the power button on the last day as quickly as any other
day of the study, and 55% enter the same password they’ve entered into the
website.
Khan[173] proposed an anti-phishing approach that utilized a one time
password and an authentication token. The approach is similar to two- factor
authentication, in that once the user provides their credential to a website,
they receive a one-time password via email or SMS and the server sends an
encrypted cookie with a short expiration time to the user. The user then has
to submit the one-time password along with the unexpired cookie to login to
the page. It is unclear if the scheme is secured against a main-in-the-middle
attack.
Costigan[174] discussed how behavioral biometric authentication can be
used as a way to ensure that attackers cannot fraudulently impersonate users
and unlawfully access their information. Behavioral biometrics systems offer
a layer of security that allows the users to authenticate themselves seam-
lessly in the background by tracking the way they interact with the device.
Machine learning algorithm trained on the actions such as keystroke pat-
terns and touch screen interactions as well as factors such as geo-location
and transaction history is used to track the behavior of the user and report
suspicious changes in the behavior to the service provider.
Many novel authentication protocols are designed to defend against phish-
ing. Some of these protocols can deployed in a seamless fashion without any
changes in the user’s behavior except for the initialization process, and some
of them required the user to adapt their behavior to the new system. Proto-
cols that require the user to change their behaviors could be rejected by the
user as it gets in the way of their primary tasks, and protocols that require
modification of the server may face challenges in getting wide scale adoption.
Although many of these protocols are provably secured against phishing, the
wide varieties of the implementations required changes to the server of the
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user’s behavior, making it impractical to be deployed in the real world.
4.2.4 Summary
Overall many techniques were proposed to defend the user from the phisher.
Offensive defense techniques attempt to poison the phisher’s database with
fake credentials, forcing the phisher to verify the credentials before selling
them. Based on the approach, the server’s response to the submission of fake
credential can also be a leverage to identify phishing websites. Credential
tracking approaches monitor the information that user provide to each web-
site, and alert them when they are providing known sensitive information to
an unverified website. While this approach would have a very low false nega-
tive rate, it may habituate the user to ignore the warnings if the warnings are
displayed too frequently. Many novel authentication protocols are proposed
with the phishing threat in mind, but most of them required modification
to the server or the change in user’s behaviors, which may hinder their wide
adoption.
4.3 Evaluation of Mitigation Techniques
The works in this section focus on the evaluation of various mitigation tech-
niques that are implemented and available for public uses. This includes
the evaluation of blacklists, browser warnings, and browser toolbars. These
mitigation techniques are evaluated in terms of their coverage against new
phishing websites, and whether the technique can successfully alert the user
of the threat.
4.3.1 Evaluation of Blacklists
Research efforts in this section evaluate the effectiveness of phishing blacklist
approaches in term of coverage and latency, and identify vulnerabilities in
blacklists that utilized crowd-sourcing approach.
Ludl et al.[175] tested the effectiveness of phishing URL blacklists main-
tained by Microsoft and Google. The authors started by collecting 10,000
phishing URLs from PhishTank over a period of 3 weeks, and used them
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to determine the accuracy of the blacklists used by Internet Explorer and
Firefox, which were maintained by Microsoft and Google respectively. They
found that both blacklists were able to correctly identify less than 66% of the
phishing URLs, but Google’s blacklist was able to identify more than 90% of
the phishing URLs that were live at the time of testing. The authors specu-
late that some of the URLs from PhishTank may not have been blacklisted
because they went oﬄine before they were considered.
Moore and Clayton[176] studied PhishTank, a crowd-based website that
generate phishing reports based on URLs submitted by its users. These
suspicious URLs are also voted on by users, and the result is published if the
majority voted the website to be phishing. The authors examine over 200,000
phishing URLs on PhishTank and found that the behaviors of the users are
consistent with a power law distribution, which means that a single highly
active user’s actions can greatly impact a system’s overall accuracy. Another
observation is that many URLs submitted to PhishTank are duplicates, which
is an efficiency issue as users have to vote multiple times for phishing URLs
from the same campaign. Also, by comparing PhishTank’s performance with
another proprietary source of phishing reports, the authors found that the
crowd-based nature of PhishTank incurred delay in verification of URLs,
and the number of non-overlapping URLs in the two sources motivates the
implementation of universal feed shared between organizations.
Moore and Clayton[177] analyzed six months of phishing feeds from multi-
ple sources, including two sub-contracted companies that take down phishing
websites. They found that take-down companies were not aware of, or be-
latedly learned about huge phishing websites that were known to others,
causing delay in the take-down of such websites. The authors estimated that
by establishing a direct linkage between the longer take down time and the
financial risks, around $330 million a year might be made safe if the take
down companies were to share information with each other. Considering the
reasons why the take down companies may not wish to share information,
the authors concluded that the companies would benefit to some extent from
data sharing, and recommended that the take down industries change its
practice, especially since the major customers of these take down companies
will benefit from the sharing of information.
Sheng et al.[178] used an anti-phishing testbed created in[90] to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of phishing blacklists. In their experiment, eight anti-
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phishing toolbars that use blacklist were evaluated against 191 fresh phish-
ing websites that were less than 30 minutes old. They found that 63% of
these phishing campaigns lasted less than two hours, and that the blacklists
were ineffective against these phishing sites as most of the blacklists caught
less than 20% of phish at hour zero. Furthermore, while the tools that used
heuristics performed significantly better initially compared to those that only
used blacklists, it took a long time for phish detected by heuristics to ap-
peared on blacklists.
Overall, the problem with the blacklist approach can be summarized into
two broad categories: timeliness, and coverage. The blacklist managed by
PhishTank relies on the users to report suspicious URLs and vote on them to
determine legitimacy, which can take a long time. Considering the lifetime
of most phishing websites, many victims would have fallen for the phishing
website before it appears on the blacklist. In term of coverage, it has been
shown that blacklists that are available to the take down companies are not
comprehensive, and that by sharing feeds with other proprietary companies,
the takedown time for many phishing websites can been lowered substan-
tially. Also, due to the user-centric approach of PhishTank, it is vulnerable
to attacks in which compromised reputable users can manipulate the blacklist
and make it less effective.
4.3.2 Evaluation of Browser Warnings
Research efforts in this section evaluate the effectiveness of various browser
warnings and suggest ways to improve them.
Jackson et al.[179] performed a usability study of extended validation
phishing defense where 27 users were asked to classify 12 websites as legiti-
mate or fraudulent. Extended validation improves upon normal web certifi-
cate by providing not only the owner of a domain name but also the identity
of the legitimate business. To test the effectiveness of this feature in helping
users determine legitimacy of websites, the users were split into three groups:
one group was trained in the use of the green address bar, one group saw the
green address bar but received no training, and the last group was not shown
any extended validation indicators at all. The authors found that users who
received the training were more likely to classify legitimate websites that
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aims to confuse the participants as legitimate, and picture-in-picture attacks
were more likely to succeed against trained participants because they ex-
pected the extended validation warnings to be 100% accurate, which is not
the case. Overall, the authors did not find that extended validation provided
a significant advantage in identifying phishing attacks with the websites in
the study.
Schechter et al.[180] evaluated how users responded to the absence of web-
site authentication features such as HTTPS indicator, lack of authentication
image in two-factor authentication, and a browser’s security warning page.
The result shows that no participants mentioned the absence of HTTPS in-
dicators, while 3% of the participants chose not to enter their password when
the authentication image is missing, and 47% of the participants chose not
to proceed to the bank’s website after seeing the certificate warning page.
Egelman et al.[181] studied the effectiveness of phishing warnings presented
by web browsers by simulating a spear phishing attack in a laboratory setting.
In the study, the participants were asked to make two purchases with their
credit card from Amazon and eBay. After the purchase, the participant
receives a phishing email with the sender spoofed to be the seller, asking
them to click on a URL in the email to verify their order or it would be
cancelled. Depending on their group, the participants were presented with
different types of browser security warning when they clicked on the link in
the emails. The authors found that significantly more users were helped by
the active Firefox warning than the active Internet Explorer (IE) warning,
and that displaying passive IE warning is no different than displaying any
warning at all. There is also a significantly different in active IE warning
compared to the control group, so displaying an active IE warning is still
significantly better than displaying no warning.
Sunshine et al.[182] conducted a survey of internet users to examine their
understanding and reactions to SSL warnings, and designed two new warn-
ings based on the results of the survey. From a survey of 409 internet users,
the authors found that risk perceptions are correlated with decisions to obey
or ignore security warnings, and those who understand the warnings perceive
different levels of risks associated with each warning. Following this survey,
the authors conducted a between-subject laboratory experiment to study the
participant’s reaction to SSL certificate warnings presented by browsers, and
two new warnings designed by the authors. The result shows that many par-
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ticipants who used Firefox 3 were unable to override the warning and thus
cannot accessed both websites. The results also indicated that the partic-
ipants understood the risk presented in the novel warning and made their
decision based on the website that they were visiting. However, the authors
also noted that these warnings do not provide adequate protection against
man in the middle attack, and that a better approach may be to minimize the
use of SSL warnings by blocking the users from making insecure connections
and not showing warnings in benign situations.
Lin et al.[183] investigated the effectiveness of domain highlighting in help-
ing users identify phishing websites. Their experiment consisted of two
phases. In the first phase, the participant was shown 16 websites, half of
which were phishing websites, and were asked to rate how “safe” they per-
ceived each website to be. In the second phase, the participant was asked
to re-evaluate the same set of websites with an instruction to focus on the
address bar area. Overall, the authors found that domain highlighting works,
but nowhere near as well as they would like. The authors suggest that do-
main highlighting can be made more effective by making the domain name
even more obvious, by drawing the user’s focus onto the address bar, by re-
ducing URL complexity, and by educating people about the importance of
domain name and various obfuscation methods employed by the attackers.
The overall results agree that passive browser warnings are significantly less
effective than active browser warnings, as it has been shown that many users
do not notice the absence of HTTPS indicators and authentication images.
Active warnings are found to be better because they interrupt the user’s
primary task and force the user to pay attention to the warning. In some
cases, active warnings successfully stop the user from accessing a phishing
website because the user does not know how to bypass the warning. Some
users also expect the security indicators to be always accurate, rendering
them vulnerable to visual spoofing attack of the indicators. It is also the case
that if a succinct explanation of the risk is provided in an active warning,
then the participants would understand the threat and heed the warning.
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4.3.3 Evaluation of Browser Toolbars
Works in this section focus on the evaluation of browser toolbars in terms of
its coverage against phishing URLs in the real world, and whether they can
effectively protect the users.
Wu et al.[184] determined that security toolbars, as well as browser’s ad-
dress and status bars, failed to prevent users from being spoofed by high
quality phishing attacks. In their role-play experiment, participants were
asked to process a list of emails, some of which were phishing emails. During
the study, participants interacted with a simulated IE browser with security
toolbars that are controlled by the researchers. A total of three different
types of security toolbars are tested in the study: A Neutral Information
toolbar which highlights the website information such as domain name and
hostname, SSL-Verification toolbar which differentiates sites that use SSL
from those that do not, and System-Decision toolbar that uses a traffic light
approach to warn users against potential phishing sites. From the experi-
ment, the authors were able to determine that the security toolbars all failed
to prevent users from being spoofed by high quality phishing site, with 45%
spoof rate for Neutral-Information toolbar, 38% for the SSL-Verification tool-
bar, and 33% for the System-Decision toolbar.
Zhang et al.[185] created an anti-phishing tool test bed and evaluated 10
anti-phishing tools against legitimate and phishing URLs. The test- bed
consisted of a task manager and a set of workers, where each worker is re-
sponsible for evaluating a single tool. A total of 200 phishing URLs from
PhishTank and APWG and 516 legitimate URLs were used to to test the
effectiveness of 10 anti-phishing tools, and the authors found that the source
of the phishing URLs and the freshness of the URLs significantly impact the
effectiveness of each tool. Only one tool was able to catch more than 60%
of phishing website from both sources, but it still missed 25% of APWG
phishing URLs and 32% of PhishTank URLs. One tool had a consistently
high catch rate of over 90%, but also had a 42% false positive rate. This
result indicated that there is no single technique that will always outperform
others, for identifying phishing websites. The authors also noted that every
tools that were tested can be exploited by the attacker, namely CDN can be
use to circumvent tools that use blacklists and a tool that analyzed a fully
loaded web page can be rendered useless by a web page that takes infinitely
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long to finish loading.
These evaluations reveal that browser security toolbar cannot adequately
protect the users. From the lab experiment, the authors noted that partic-
ipants failed to continuously check the security indicators, possibly because
maintaining security is not their primary goal, and the participants who no-
tice suspicious signs either did not know how to interpret the warning or
explained them away. A large scale evaluation of 10 anti-phishing toolbars
against verified phishing URLs also reveal a severe lack of coverage, and
the researchers also demonstrated that all of the security toolbars can be
circumvented.
4.3.4 Evaluation with Eye-Tracking Softwares
The works in this section involved the use of eye tracking software to evaluate
browser security indicators and suggest they can be improved.
Darwish and Bataineh[186] studied the behavior of phishing victims’ eyes
on several predetermined area of interests, and empirically presented users’
evaluation of several web pages by using eye tracking softwares. The authors
specify the area of interest to be the domain name area, digital certificate
indicator, HTTPS indicator, and the content of the web page. They found
that participants who correctly identified the phishing websites were inter-
ested in the domain name area, and that digital certificate area was ignored
by all groups of users except when it is present with contrasting green back-
ground. Participants check the HTTPS indicator on half of the websites, and
the mean time to fixation indicates that the participants check the HTTPS
indicator, domain name, digital signature, and page content in order. How-
ever, login area was spotted before any other page contents, which could be
a security risk since the participants may be fixated on the task of logging
into the website and did not pay attention to the security cues in the other
areas of the website’s content.
Whalen and Inkpen[187] evaluated the effectiveness of web browser vi-
sual feedback security mechanisms by performing an eye-tracking experiment.
Specifically, the authors investigated which security cues were ignored, which
were easily noticed, and which were hard to find. The results suggest that
the lock icon is the security cue that is most often looked at, but only a few
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participants interact with it. Certificates are also seldom used, and some of
the more experienced users do not notice any security cues. They also found
that small browser icons can be easily misidentified, and users tend to stop
looking for security cues after they have signed into a website. From this, the
authors suggest that standardized location of security cues across browsers
would be beneficial to the user, and that maybe certificate data should have
its own icon separate from the lock to make it easier to find.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results from these research indicate that users
do look at the security indicators on the browser’s chrome before the web page
content. HTTPS indicator and the lock icon are the first things that users
check, and they are the indicators that were looked at most often. Certificates
are seldom looked at, and the small icons in the browsers are reported to be
misidentified by the users. Users also noticed the login portion of the web
page first, suggesting that they may be so focused on the task of logging
into the website that they do not check other contents in the web page for
security cues.
4.3.5 Summary
Overall, the evaluations presented in this section illustrate that the current
mitigation techniques are inadequate at protecting the users. The current
blacklists are not updated in a timely manner, and the gap in coverage be-
tween public and proprietary blacklists cause many phishing websites to live
longer than it should have. Passive browser warnings are shown to be ignored
by the users, and active warning that interrupt the users are found to be ef-
fective, especially if the users cannot workaround the warning to proceed to
the insecure website. The browser toolbars that were evaluated in the studies
have a poor coverage, and circumvention techniques were demonstrated for
all of them. Results from eye tracking studies suggest that while the users
do look at the some security indicators in the browser, they do not take full
advantage of them and stop looking for them once they have logged into a
website.
82
4.4 User Education
User education is an important factor in the fight against phishing. Even
with all of the technical counter measures that were put in place to assist
the users, the last line of defense is always the users themselves. “How can
we educate users to recognize signs that can help them identify phishing
emails?” is the question that needs to be answered. Several works evaluated
the quality of the security tips that are currently available to the users, and
identified how they could be improved. New education approaches were also
proposed and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness to prevent users from
falling for phish. These approaches include embedded training, phishing IQ
tests, comics, and games.
4.4.1 Evaluation of Security Tips
The research works in this category aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the
current state of security awareness tips and suggestions.
Alnajim and Munro[188] proposed an effectiveness criteria for evaluation
of effectiveness of security tips and attempted to identify a small subset
of effective anti-phishing tips that users can focus on. After surveying the
online fraud tips for both businesses’ and users’ tips, they identified 21 anti-
phishing tips that were applicable to phishing websites. The tips were eval-
uated against a sample of 42 phishing websites from APWG’s archive, and
result indicated that even the best tip did not satisfy all of their effectiveness
criteria, as it had a possibility to produce false negative or false positive on
its own.
Kirlappos et al.[189] evaluated an anti-phishing tool in a laboratory setting
and found that when tempted by a “good deal”, participants did not focus
on the warning and instead looked for signs that they thought confirmed a
site’s trustworthiness. In the study, a list of six websites were shown to the
participants with an instruction to buy tickets from one of them within five
minutes. The participants received more compensation if they managed to
purchase the ticket at a lower price. The result from this experiment showed
that while most participants who used a anti-phishing tool chose to buy from
a website that the tool reported to be safe, a significant number of partici-
pants chose to buy from a website labeled as potentially risky but had better
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potential rewards. In a debriefing interview, these participants reported that
factors such as previous experience with a brand, logos, certifications and
social media references influenced their confidence in the websites. These re-
ports suggested that the current model of security advice given to the users
were not adequate, in that users may simply used trust indicators to guide
their choices without knowing how it verified the website’s legitimacy, making
them vulnerable to malicious websites that spoofed these trust indicators.
Harley[190] argued that users’ rejection of security advices was entirely
rational from an economic perspective: the advices prevented them from
the direct loss of attacks but burdened them with indirect cost in the form
of efforts. Since victimization was rare and imposed a one-time cost while
security advice applied to everyone in an ongoing fashion, the burden of
following security advices ended up being larger than the burden caused by
the loss. In teaching users to recognized phishing sites by reading URLs, the
security advices quickly evolved from seemingly reasonable advices such as
“watch for IP address in URL” into a requirement that users needed to know
how to parse URLs. Also, the actual benefit to users in avoiding this type
of phishing attacks depended on how the banks and the users split the loss.
It appeared that most banks would shoulder the entire loss in most cases.
In another area, the benefit from teaching users about SSL certificate and
related browser warnings was a protection against man in the middle attack.
However, from the user’s perspective, almost all of the certificate errors that
they experienced were false positives. From a big picture, the burdens from
following the security advices could resulted in a net loss to the user.
These results suggested that a change of direction in security awareness
training is needed. To help users avoid harm, the effort should begin with a
clear understanding of the actual harm that the users face, and a realistic un-
derstanding of the constraints imposed by the advice. The security solutions
should also be tailor based on its relevancy to how users make security deci-
sion in their everyday activity, instead of flooding them with large amount
of information.
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4.4.2 Embedded Training
Embedded training is a type of training system that delivers the training
material to the users through a simulated phishing email. Aiming to take
advantage of the moment that the users fall for a phishing email as a learning
opportunity, these emails contain an embedded URL that, when clicked,
delivers a training message to the users. The training message can varies from
a simple warning about an unsafe action to a full-fledged training materials,
depending on the goals of the system designer. A real world deployment of
the system can be use not only as a vector to deliver training material, but
also to measure the recipient’s ability to distinguish phishing emails as well.
Kumaraguru et al.[191] created PhishGuru, an embedded training sys-
tem that sends out fake phishing emails with an embedded link that display
phishing training material when clicked. To evaluate the effectiveness of the
system in real life, the authors conducted a study where phishing emails are
sent to the participants drawn from a universities population. The authors
were able to verified that participants who received the embedded training
email could identify phishing emails better than those in the control con-
ditions after they received the first intervention. Participants who saw the
intervention twice also performed better than those who saw the intervention
once. The training did not affect the participant’s ability to identify legiti-
mate emails. The authors also conducted an experiment to determine how
well the users retained knowledge gained through PhishGuru, and how well
they transferred this knowledge to identify other types of phishing emails[77].
The study was conducted in a laboratory setting, where the participant role
played as a user and went through a list of emails addressed to them, behav-
ing as they would in real life. The participants were split into three groups:
one group receive an embedded training email, one group receive the same
training material in the body of an email, and one group did not receive
any training. The result showed that the participants learn more effectively
and retain more knowledge about how to avoid phishing when trained with
embedded training, and participants who took the embedded training also
transfer knowledge better in that they were better at identifying different
type of email as phishing. Sheng et al.[64] also evaluated the effectiveness
of PhishGuru’s style of interventions. They found that participants fell for
47% of the phishing website on average before training and 28% after the
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training, which was significantly better than the control group who did not
received any training between the two role-plays.
Alnajim and Munro[192] proposed an anti-phishing approach that uses em-
bedded training intervention for phishing websites detection (APTIPWD).
The architecture of the proposed anti-phishing system involved a proxy server
that sit between the user and the Internet, and a blacklist of known phishing
websites. When a user requested a website that is on the blacklist, the proxy
listened for a form submission, intercepted it, and displayed an intervention
message to the user. The authors evaluated their approach in a role-play
experiment with 36 participants, in which he participants were asked to read
and handle 14 emails, some of which are training and phishing emails. The
result indicated that the participants in all training conditions (no training,
information email, embedded training email) were nearly equal in terms of
reaction to legitimate and phishing emails before the training, but the par-
ticipants in the embedded training group performed significantly better after
receiving the training.
Gupta and Kumaraguru[193] explored phishing trends and analyzed the
effectiveness of an Anti-Phishing landing page. Anti-Phishing landing page
was a web page designed to take advantage of the most teachable moment
when the user just clicked on a link to a phishing website that was taken
down by ISPs. Instead of displaying an error, the ISP redirected the user to
the landing page, which informed the user that they just tried to access a
phishing website and offered tips about how the user could protect himself
against phishing. Analysis of the log files showed that 46% of users clicked
lesser number of phishing URLs in April 2014 than in January 2014.
Caputo et al.[194] explored spear phishing awareness and embedded train-
ing by sending phishing emails to employees of a corporation. Similar to the
experiment by Kumaraguru et al.[77], the authors tested the participants’ re-
tention of the training material over the period of 90 days by sending out three
phishing emails. All of the emails contained a link that either redirected to
a website containing the training materials, or a website that simply alerted
the participants that they have just been phished. Their result indicated
that the training does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that a
participant would fall for phishing email, and that based on the amount of
time that participants spend on the training page, many of them did not stay
on the page long enough to fully read the training material, and hence they
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effectively did not receive the training.
Jansson and Solms[195] conducted a naturalistic phishing experiment to
determine whether a simulated phishing attack together with embedded
training contribute towards strengthening users’ resistance toward phishing
attacks. Four different types of phishing emails were used in the experiment:
an email claiming a crashed database, an email claiming the recipient won a
lottery, an email claiming a virus scanner in the attachment, and an email
claiming to have pictures of pretty women. If the recipient of the email re-
acted insecurely (i.e. by clicking on the link or opening the attachment), they
will be presented with a warning page with a link to take additional training.
Two rounds of emails were sent out to an institution population of 25,579
a week apart, with 9,273 users recorded being active on the email system
on the first week and 8,231 in the second week. The result showed that the
number of users who reacted insecurely dropped by 11% on the second week,
and that the phishing email that claimed to have pictures of pretty women
was the most enticing phishing email.
Overall, the research in this area has shown that embedded training was
an effective method: users are able to better identify phishing emails and
avoid performing unsafe actions after receiving the training. The users also
retained the knowledge from the training from over time, and able to applied
it to other kinds of phishing emails. Embedded training also did not affect
the way users perceived legitimate email.
4.4.3 Phishing IQ Tests
Phishing IQ test is a test designed to measure the test taker’s ability to
identify phishing emails. In a phishing IQ test, a sequence of screenshots of
email messages is shown to the test taker, and the test taker has to identify
whether the email is legitimate or fraudulent. Due to the general and static
nature of the test, several works were completed to evaluate the effectiveness
of the phishing IQ tests. Modifications to the phishing IQ test were also
proposed.
Anandpara[196] argued that phishing IQ tests failed to measure the user’s
susceptibility to phishing attacks. This insight came as a result of an exper-
iment where participants took a phishing IQ tests that has different number
87
of questions corresponding to phishing email. The authors found no cor-
relation between the actual number of phishing email’s questions and the
number of emails that the subject reported to be phishing. Furthermore,
after the subjects received the training and retook the test with a different
set of questions, the numbers of emails reported to be phishing in the second
test was substantially larger those that of the first test, indicating that the
measurable effect of phishing education was increased concern, not increased
ability.
Robila and Ragucci[197] designed a phishing user education by modifying
phishing IQ tests to suit the university’s context. By examining browser’s
history from the university’s computer laboratory and other resources that
are available to the students on campus, the authors decided to include web-
sites of 12 companies in the IQ survey. 48 students from an Introduction to
Computing course took the surveys, achieving a correctness rate of 57%. A
post- study survey was administered to evaluate the educational value of the
survey, and the responses indicated that 78% of the students were not aware
of phishing prior to the IQ survey, and 93% acknowledge receiving possible
phishing emails in the past.
Werner and Courte[198] analyzed the effectiveness of phishing IQ test as
a learning tool from the perspective of college students. In their experiment,
participants took the SonicWall Phishing IQ test, then received a description
and explanation of the security indicators in both the legitimate emails and
phishing emails. The results indicated that the phishing IQ test significantly
improve the participant’s perceived ability and confidence in detecting phish-
ing emails, and 80% of the participants reported that the phishing IQ test was
helpful. As a follow up to this study, Bekkering et al.[199] evaluated the im-
provement in the test taker’s ability to differentiate between phishing emails
and legitimate emails after taking a phishing IQ test. The participants were
asked to identified phishing emails from a set of emails, took the phishing IQ
test, then performed the identification task again on another set of emails.
The results indicated a modest significant increase in the performance of the
participants after the training, but the results were not uniformly positive.
Tseng et al.[200] proposed a framework for a dynamic generation of content
for an anti-phishing education game. The anti-phishing game described by
the authors was similar in structure to a phishing IQ test. The anti-phishing
education game helped users build knowledge of phishing based on a few
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static phishing examples. This made it difficult for the users to applied the
knowledge in the real world. Hence, the authors proposed two models: one
that records the features of a phishing web page and one that describes web
page obfuscation techniques. These models were then utilized in the game
to dynamically generate phishing scenarios.
These results suggested that while a static phishing IQ test may be inef-
fective at measuring the participant’s ability to detect phishing email, mod-
ification of the materials presented in the test can be made to improve its
efficacy. Specifically, the use benefited from the tests that used websites that
closely related to what the users encountered in real life.
4.4.4 Comics
Some works proposed the use of cartoons or comic strips as a medium for
teaching computer security. The motivation for this type of user education
came from the observation that many security education presented the users
with set of instructions to follow without proper explanation. Comics, on the
other hand, presented the security advice in a way that the user can relate
to: by presenting a situation and implications of different actions to the user.
Srikwan and Jakobsson[201] described the design principles behind Securi-
tyCartoon.com, the first cartoon-based approach to teaching risks to internet
users. The authors argued that the cartoon-based approach is likely to pro-
duce better long-term effects than current education efforts and identified
some problems with the current practice. These problems included the use
of advice that are hard to follow, not very important, and may makes the
user more vulnerable to other attacks. With these in mind, the goal of the
cartoons-based approach is based on four core principles: research driven
content selection tailored around observed user’s behaviors, education mes-
sage that are accessible and easy to read, immersion in the content through
repeated communication of the message framed in different ways to the user,
and adaptability of the material to the ever-changing threat.
Kumaraguru et al.[202] designed an embedded training system to teach
users about the risks associated with phishing and how to identify and avoid
phishing attacks in emails. The authors evaluated the effectiveness of three
different type of intervention, security notice, text and graphic, and comic
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strips. In the experiment, each participant was shown 19 email messages
consisted of legitimate messages, training messages, spam messages, and ac-
tual phishing messages. They found that the participants in the comic strips
intervention group perform significantly better than the security notice group
and the “text and graphic” group but found no significant different between
the performance of the “text and graphic” group and the security notices
group.
While there were not many research done in the area, the result of one
experiment showed that comic strips were significantly more effective than
security notice at educating users about phishing.
4.4.5 Games
Several works explored the use of interactive game as a medium to teach peo-
ple about phishing. Specifically, there are two games that were implemented
on the web and mobile platform that teaches user about the structure of a
URL and how to recognize phishing URLs.
Sheng et al.[203] created Anti-Phishing Phil, a game that teaches users
about how to identify phishing URLs. In the game, the player assumed the
role of Phil, a young fish living in the Interweb Bay. Phil wanted to eat
worms. Each real worm in the game was labeled with a legitimate URL, and
each fake worm was labeled with phishing URL. The goal of the player was
to eat the real worms and rejected the bad worms before running out of time.
The game proceeded in rounds, with each round focusing on different types of
phishing URLs. A study was conducted to test the effectiveness of the game
in training users by using a between-subjects experiment where the subjects
were split into three groups: one group was trained with existing training
material, one group was trained with Anti-Phishing Phil materials, and one
group played the actual game. The authors found that subjects in the game
condition performed best overall. This result showed that interactive games
could be a promising way of teaching people about strategies to avoid falling
for phishing attacks.
Similar to Anti-Phishing Phil, Arachchilage et al.[204] developed a proto-
type anti-phishing game on a mobile platform as an educational tool to teach
users how to recognize phishing URLs. In the game, the user assumed the
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role of a small fish in a big pond. The objective of the game is to eat worms
that are labeled with legitimate URLs and avoid the works that are labeled
with malicious URLs. The authors conducted a user study of the prototype
game by having 20 participants identified legitimate URLs from a list of 10
suspicious URLs prior to playing the game. The participants then evaluated
the legitimacy of another 10 suspicious URLs after having played the game.
The result indicated that the participants were better at identifying phishing
URLs after they have played the game.
Overall, several research works have shown promising results that inter-
active games could be an effective approach to help users detect phishing
attempts. The results also indicated that users who were trained by playing
the game were significantly better at identifying phishing URLs than those
who were trained by reading traditional security notices.
4.4.6 Summary
In conclusion, the works in this area indicated that the current security tips
available to the user is ineffective by themselves, and the proposed alter-
nate education methods show promising results in helping the users recog-
nize phishing attempts and avoid falling for them. Current security tips are
numerous, and most of them neither provide the users with a proper under-
standing on how to avoid harms nor is effective on their own. On the other
hand, new methods such as embedded training were shown to be effective at
reducing the rate in which users fall for phishing attempt. Embedded train-
ing can also be use as a tool to evaluate the users’ ability, and target the
training at those who need it. Phishing IQ tests were shown to be ineffective
by itself as an educational tool to help the user identify phishing emails, but
adaptation of its framework to use with a set of phishing emails that tar-
get a particular population has promising results. Comics and Games were
considered as an alternate medium for conveying education materials with
encouraging results.
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4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed detection and defense techniques, as well as
the evaluation of some of them. Many detection schemes were proposed with
varying degrees of success. While no one scheme is capable of detecting all
phishing websites, some of the tools can be deployed together to complement
each other. A number of defensive techniques were also proposed, but most of
them either required a change to the server infrastructure or a change in user’s
behavior, both of which are obstacles for wide scale adoption. Evaluations of
the anti-phishing tools revealed that most of the tools lack coverage against
new phish and can be easily circumvented by the phisher. Some of the tools
that are too passive failed to get the user’s attention, and tools that interrupt
the user’s primary task to display the warning are found to be significantly
more effective.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH ETHICS
Due to its nature, a number of considerations needed to be made in the
designing of a phishing experiment.
Finn and Jakobsson[205, 206] described the ethical and procedural aspects
of phishing experiment. Naturalistic experiments mimic real phishing attacks
where fake phishing emails are sent by the researcher to a group of subjects
in a way that cannot be distinguished from real life phishing attacks. This
approach have the benefit of being able to measure the danger of attacks
but poses an ethical issues since the experiment itself constitute a phishing
attack. The main ethical concerns for naturalistic phishing experiments are
the use of deception and complete waiver of informed consents. These two
components are necessary in order to not alert the subjects of the attack.
Another important aspect is the debriefing process, in which the subjects
are given explanation of the nature and purpose of the deception and the
researchers attempt to alleviate any discomfort the subjects may experience
upon learning that they have been deceived. The authors noted that nat-
uralistic phishing experiment was a unique case, where the primary source
of harm to the subject may be the debriefing process itself. In naturalistic
experiment, the subjects who were aware of phishing attacks were likely to
not be fooled by the experiment, and disregard the email as another one of
the many phishing emails that they encountered on a regular basis. Subjects
who were not aware of phishing attacks may be fooled by the experiment,
but any information that they provided would be discarded by the researcher
and no physical or financial harm would result. However, if the latter group
of subjects were debriefed, they may be upset, anxious, or angry that they
were deceived. Also, depending on the debriefing process, these subjects may
not be able to have their immediate concerns addressed by the researchers.
Hence, depending on the experiment, a waiver of the debriefing process may
be considered. Here, we include a review of one of the authors’ case study in
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which a waiver of debriefing process was granted.
Case Study Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz [207] designed an experiment that
used eBay’s internal messaging service to discover the email address of eBay
users. eBay’s internal messaging service allows eBay users to message each
other using only their usernames without revealing the email address of either
party. The authors were able to identify an artifact in the messaging system’s
design that allow an eBay user other than the intended recipient to reply to
a message if they have access to the email that was sent to the recipient.
The authors used this functionality to craft an apparent phishing email that
allowed them to verify if a user clicked on a phishing link and entered their
credentials.
In this experiment, the authors chose to avoid the debriefing phase as it
would significantly increased the harm done to the subjects. If the subjects
detected the apparent fraud attempt, they would simply not provide their
credentials to eBay, and they would perceived that nothing unusual had
happened. If the subjects provided their credentials to the website, nothing
unusual had happened to them as well since they are authenticating into
the actual eBay website. Debriefing either group of subjects would greatly
increase the harms done to them, which is the opposite of the purpose of
debriefing.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary
Phishing presents a widespread threat to Internet users and, as such, a myriad
of research has studied the field. We created a taxonomy of these works
and identified four major categories: attack characteristics, victim profiling,
mitigation techniques, and user education.
A large portion of phishing research studies elements that affect campaign
efficacy. One of the easiest ways to make a campaign more effective is called
contextual phishing. Contextual phishing more thoroughly fools users by
including information specific to its targets and was found to be generally
more effective in successfully phishing a larger number of victims. We also
discussed alternative attack vectors and various aspects of phishing that are
not observable through phishing emails and websites.
The only factor that was identified to directly correlate to a user’s suscep-
tibility to phishing is habituation. Users are more likely to fall for the attack
when they habitually process emails without much attention. Women and
younger individuals were reported to be more susceptible to phishing, but
this result may be skewed by factors such as their experience with phishing
education and Internet expertise. There is no consensus about the influence
of personality or cognition reflection to phishing susceptibility.
Many detection and defense schemes were proposed to counter phishing
with varying degrees of success. While no one scheme is capable of detecting
all phishing websites, many machine learning tools reported a very high ac-
curacy rate with a modest number of false positives. A number of defensive
techniques were also proposed, but most of them exhibit requirements that
could prohibit wide scale adoption. Evaluations of many anti-phishing tools
revealed that most of the tools lack coverage against unseen phishing attacks
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and thus can easily be circumvented by the phisher.
Novel user education methods proved effective in helping users recognize
and avoid phishing attempts. Embedded training was shown to be effective at
reducing the rate at which users fall for phishing attempts. Phishing IQ tests
were shown to be ineffective by themselves as an educational tool, but the
adaptation of the phishing IQ framework to use with a set of phishing emails
that target a particular population has shown promising results. Researchers
have also successfully made training more palatable to users by presenting
phishing training in comics and games.
6.2 Future Works
Based on our taxonomy, we identified several studies that would be beneficial
to conduct in an effort to expand our knowledge of phishing.
Characteristics of Current Phish We found that research we encoun-
tered is heavily skewed toward the proposal and implementation of mitigation
techniques, with high emphasis on the development of automatic detection
frameworks. The research that studies attack characteristics of phishing
are also relatively outdated, with most current work focusing on applying
machine learning techniques to detect phishing. As phishing is constantly
evolving, we believe that investigating trends in characteristics of phishing
campaigns both in terms of content and attack vector is needed to better
understand the current state of attacks.
Continued Evaluation While many of the proposed detection techniques
are implemented and evaluated against a sample of phish captured in the
wild, not many systems were analyzed against unseen phishing campaigns
over time. As we have seen, phishing evolves over time and the detection
techniques that work today may prove not quite as useful in the near future.
Hence, we believe that a continued evaluation of the proposed techniques are
needed to determine their efficacy in detecting this ever-changing threat.
Change the user’s perspective Currently, most financial institutions
shoulder most if not all of the financial loss due to phishing by offering fraud
96
protection to their clients. This is without a doubt beneficial to users, but
it also puts them in a mindset where they do not suffer consequences from
the phishing attacks, potentially making them care less about securing their
information. We believe that a change in user’s education is necessary. More
emphasis should be put on consequences of clicking on malicious links than
on submitting information to a phishing website.
6.3 Conclusion
Phishing is a form of attack that aims to steal information from users by
impersonating a trusted entity. This thesis presents a taxonomy of phishing
that encompasses research studying the attack, the victim, and the defense.
We found that novel education methods such as embedded training are ef-
fective at teaching the users about phishing and other risks associated with
clicking on links in emails. We believe education can be something of a silver
bullet. Many current and proposed phishing defenses (such as those used by
financial institutions) that keep users in the dark about the dangers of vis-
iting malicious websites inadvertently open users to other attacks associated
with visiting malicious websites. It is essential that users show discretion
when visiting websites. Further, we found work on attack characteristics to
be outdated and overly focused on attacks associated with phishing emails.
Widespread adoption of social networks provides users with alternative com-
munication methods that could be exploited by phishers. Research needs to
be conducted that studies current attack characteristics and attack vectors.
This also implies the need to evaluate the adaptability of proposed detection
techniques to this constantly evolving threat. The accuracy of many ma-
chine learning based methods were evaluated based on a sample of phishing
attacks which is a static dataset. We argue that future work should focus on
the evaluation of these systems over time in order to gauge their efficacy in
a real-world environment.
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